Startseite Philosophie „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung
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„Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung

  • Anja Weiberg

Abstract

In this paper, I aim to explain Wittgenstein’s use of the expressions of the sublime and sublimation, since this can illuminate a key aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, namely, his critique of those conceptions in which it is seen as the task of a logical analysis to refrain from everyday language, and to “purify” the concepts considered relevant for a philosophical investigation in order to make them suitable for such an investigation in the first place, linked to the idea of a hidden essence of language that is to be discovered. In the first two sections, I examine the contexts in which Wittgenstein addresses the sublime to specify his understanding of this concept. The third section explains in more detail why Wittgenstein is critical of the ideal of sublimation. In the fourth section, first, a remark by Wittgenstein in which he addresses sublimation using the example of different investigations of the concept of knowledge is taken up. Building on this, I discuss the question of whether the previous considerations can be made fruitful for the interpretation of some remarks from On Certainty.

Abstract

In this paper, I aim to explain Wittgenstein’s use of the expressions of the sublime and sublimation, since this can illuminate a key aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, namely, his critique of those conceptions in which it is seen as the task of a logical analysis to refrain from everyday language, and to “purify” the concepts considered relevant for a philosophical investigation in order to make them suitable for such an investigation in the first place, linked to the idea of a hidden essence of language that is to be discovered. In the first two sections, I examine the contexts in which Wittgenstein addresses the sublime to specify his understanding of this concept. The third section explains in more detail why Wittgenstein is critical of the ideal of sublimation. In the fourth section, first, a remark by Wittgenstein in which he addresses sublimation using the example of different investigations of the concept of knowledge is taken up. Building on this, I discuss the question of whether the previous considerations can be made fruitful for the interpretation of some remarks from On Certainty.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
  4. Editorial 1
  5. I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
  6. Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
  7. ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
  8. “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
  9. Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
  10. Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
  11. Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
  12. The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
  13. Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
  14. Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
  15. Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
  16. Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
  17. Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
  18. Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
  19. Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
  20. „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
  21. About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
  22. An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
  23. “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
  24. The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
  25. II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
  26. “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
  27. Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
  28. Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
  29. Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
  30. Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
  31. A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
  32. III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
  33. The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
  34. Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
  35. Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
  36. Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
  37. Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
  38. Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
  39. Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
  40. Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
  41. „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
  42. IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
  43. “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
  44. Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
  45. The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
  46. Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
  47. Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
  48. Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
  49. Index 633
Heruntergeladen am 1.12.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783111453040-036/html?lang=de
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