What’s So Special About Legalized Sex? (Or, How Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?)
Abstract
In this essay I reassess a long-standing sore point within Kant’s moral and legal philosophy - viz., his position on heterosexual sex and marriage. My own standpoint is consciously retrograde. In opposition to recent revisionist efforts by feminist scholars to defend Kantian models of marriage, I believe early critics of Kant such as Christian Gottfried Schütz and Friedrich Bouterwek were right: his position on sex and marriage is not salvageable. Human sexual activity is not inherently or necessarily objectifying, humans do not devolve into animals bereft of rationality, free will, and responsibility when they engage in sex, and the institution of marriage does not necessarily resolve the inherent problems Kant sees in sex. Finally, his notorious effort to forge a third division of private law - “personal right of the thingly kind” - is not only enigmatic but ultimately incoherent.
Abstract
In this essay I reassess a long-standing sore point within Kant’s moral and legal philosophy - viz., his position on heterosexual sex and marriage. My own standpoint is consciously retrograde. In opposition to recent revisionist efforts by feminist scholars to defend Kantian models of marriage, I believe early critics of Kant such as Christian Gottfried Schütz and Friedrich Bouterwek were right: his position on sex and marriage is not salvageable. Human sexual activity is not inherently or necessarily objectifying, humans do not devolve into animals bereft of rationality, free will, and responsibility when they engage in sex, and the institution of marriage does not necessarily resolve the inherent problems Kant sees in sex. Finally, his notorious effort to forge a third division of private law - “personal right of the thingly kind” - is not only enigmatic but ultimately incoherent.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Abbreviations VII
- Introduction 1
- What’s So Special About Legalized Sex? (Or, How Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?) 17
- Animal Desire and Rational Nature: Kant’s Argument for Marriage and the Problem of ‘Unnatural’ Sex 35
- How to Have Good Kantian Sex 63
- Kant and Austen on Free Love 85
- Kant on Menschenliebe as a Moral Predisposition of the Mind 107
- From Self-Preservation to Cosmopolitan Friendship: Kant and the Conceptual Structure of Love 127
- Kant on Friendship and Misanthropy 149
- Friendship as a Scaffolding Duty to the Highest Good 165
- Index of Persons 187
- Index of Subjects 189
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Abbreviations VII
- Introduction 1
- What’s So Special About Legalized Sex? (Or, How Can Two Wrongs Make a Right?) 17
- Animal Desire and Rational Nature: Kant’s Argument for Marriage and the Problem of ‘Unnatural’ Sex 35
- How to Have Good Kantian Sex 63
- Kant and Austen on Free Love 85
- Kant on Menschenliebe as a Moral Predisposition of the Mind 107
- From Self-Preservation to Cosmopolitan Friendship: Kant and the Conceptual Structure of Love 127
- Kant on Friendship and Misanthropy 149
- Friendship as a Scaffolding Duty to the Highest Good 165
- Index of Persons 187
- Index of Subjects 189
