Startseite Philosophie How Social Movements Bear Collective Duties
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How Social Movements Bear Collective Duties

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Epistemic Resistance, Radical Politics, Positionality
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Epistemic Resistance, Radical Politics, Positionality

Abstract

Stephanie Collins (2019) and Bill Wringe (2016) disagree on how groups bear collective duties. For Collins, in order to bear a collective duty, a group should have a decision-making procedure and only agential groups have such procedures. On this view, social movements cannot bear collective duties if they lack decisionmaking procedures. Contra Collins, Wringe argues that groups without decisionmaking procedures can bear collective duties when they share the moral phenomenology that we have a duty together. So on Wringe’s view, social movements can bear collective duties even if they lack decision-making procedures. I agree with Wringe that the decision-making procedure criterion should not be a requirement for collective duties. However, I argue that collective duties are best explained by basic moral certainties because we can explain how group individuals can unite and act autonomously. And I argue that the paradigmatic case of collective duties as basic moral certainties can be found in social movements.

Abstract

Stephanie Collins (2019) and Bill Wringe (2016) disagree on how groups bear collective duties. For Collins, in order to bear a collective duty, a group should have a decision-making procedure and only agential groups have such procedures. On this view, social movements cannot bear collective duties if they lack decisionmaking procedures. Contra Collins, Wringe argues that groups without decisionmaking procedures can bear collective duties when they share the moral phenomenology that we have a duty together. So on Wringe’s view, social movements can bear collective duties even if they lack decision-making procedures. I agree with Wringe that the decision-making procedure criterion should not be a requirement for collective duties. However, I argue that collective duties are best explained by basic moral certainties because we can explain how group individuals can unite and act autonomously. And I argue that the paradigmatic case of collective duties as basic moral certainties can be found in social movements.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Contents V
  3. Introduction: From Social Movements to Philosophy (and Back Again) 1
  4. Section 1: At the Intersection Between Academia and Social Movements
  5. Critical Social Ontology and Social Movements 13
  6. Social Movements and Epistemic Injustice 35
  7. Feminist Research as a Response to Political and Epistemic Violences 45
  8. Section 2: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Social Movements
  9. Social Ontology and Social Movements
  10. Toward a Liberatory Metaphysics of Sexuality 59
  11. The Political Ontology of Rawls’ Model of Disobedience: Depoliticization Through Moralization 77
  12. Social Movements and Epistemology
  13. How Social Movements Bear Collective Duties 103
  14. How Politics Shapes the Value of Perceptual Experience: From Epistemic to Prudential Value 121
  15. The Standpoint of the Oppressed Must Be Conquered by the Oppressed Class Itself: Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Autonomy 143
  16. Section 3: How Specific Social Movements Inform Philosophy
  17. Climate Social Movements and the Politics of Leadership 169
  18. Viral Social Movements, State(s) of Emergency, and the Insurgent Public Realm: A Philosophical Analysis of China’s 2020 – 2022 Social Movements 187
  19. Anchoring Disablement: Social Definitions and Social Ontology in Britain’s Disabled People’s Movement 207
  20. European Health Social Movements: An Introduction 229
  21. List of Contributors 251
  22. Index 253
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111193748-007

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Contents V
  3. Introduction: From Social Movements to Philosophy (and Back Again) 1
  4. Section 1: At the Intersection Between Academia and Social Movements
  5. Critical Social Ontology and Social Movements 13
  6. Social Movements and Epistemic Injustice 35
  7. Feminist Research as a Response to Political and Epistemic Violences 45
  8. Section 2: Contemporary Approaches to the Philosophy of Social Movements
  9. Social Ontology and Social Movements
  10. Toward a Liberatory Metaphysics of Sexuality 59
  11. The Political Ontology of Rawls’ Model of Disobedience: Depoliticization Through Moralization 77
  12. Social Movements and Epistemology
  13. How Social Movements Bear Collective Duties 103
  14. How Politics Shapes the Value of Perceptual Experience: From Epistemic to Prudential Value 121
  15. The Standpoint of the Oppressed Must Be Conquered by the Oppressed Class Itself: Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Autonomy 143
  16. Section 3: How Specific Social Movements Inform Philosophy
  17. Climate Social Movements and the Politics of Leadership 169
  18. Viral Social Movements, State(s) of Emergency, and the Insurgent Public Realm: A Philosophical Analysis of China’s 2020 – 2022 Social Movements 187
  19. Anchoring Disablement: Social Definitions and Social Ontology in Britain’s Disabled People’s Movement 207
  20. European Health Social Movements: An Introduction 229
  21. List of Contributors 251
  22. Index 253
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Heruntergeladen am 6.11.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783111193748-007/html?lang=de
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