An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. I-IV I
2. Contents V
3. Introduction 1
4. I The Correspondence Theory
5. Truth : Concept and Property 11
6. Truths and Truthmakers 27
7. Truth Through Thick and Thin 38
8. The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth 60
9. Truth, Meaning, and Reference 79
10. II Deflationism Defended
11. Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth 103
12. On Locating Our Interest in Truth 120
13. Norms of Truth and Meaning 133
14. On Some Critics of Deflationism 146
15. III Deflationism Attacked
16. Minimalism and the Facts About Truth 161
17. Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth 176
18. The Truth about Truth 194
19. Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences 205
20. IV Tarski Challenged
21. An Argument Against Tarski's Convention Τ 225
22. What is Truth? Stay for an Answer 238
23. V Alternative Approaches
24. The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth 249
25. Truth: A Prolegomenon to a General Theory 263
26. How Not to Misunderstand Peirce - A Pragmatist Account of Truth 283
27. A Problem about Truth 299
28. An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth 316
29. Index of Subjects 333
30. Index of Names 334
31. Contributors 337