Logical Modality and Attitudes to Propositions

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. I-XX I
2. Von Wright on Actions, Norms, and Values
3. Ought to Be – Ought to Do 3
4. Value, Norm, and Action in My Philosophical Writings 11
5. Part I: Actions
6. Law and Action. Reflections on Collective Legal Actions 37
7. Grounds for Acting, Grounds for Knowing 55
8. On Mind and Matter 65
9. Remarks on Psycho-Physical Parallelism 79
10. Explanation and Understanding of Actions 85
11. Action Explanations as ‘Understanding’ Explanations 89
12. Understanding of Actions. Some Problems 103
13. The Neurological Correlates of Action Types 111
14. Mind, Matter, and our Longing for the ‘One World’ 123
15. Willing and Acting 139
16. Results, Consequences, Intentions 147
17. On Freedom and Determinism 159
18. What Is the Matter of Mind? 171
19. Intentionalists and Davidson on Rational Explanation 191
20. Part II: Norms
21. Logical Modality and Attitudes to Propositions 211
22. Concrete Transitions 227
23. Existence of Norms 237
24. Reasonableness as a Criterion of Moral Correctness? 245
25. Paradoxes of Commitment 255
26. Causality in Penal Law – Explanation or Understanding? A Sketch 265
27. Are There ‘Collective Agents’ in Modern Legal Systems? 273
28. Legal Principles 279
29. The Importance of Legal Principles 285
30. Logical Analysis in the Realm of the Law 291
31. Part III: Values
32. The Varieties of Legal Values 307
33. The Norm-Value Distinction in 1963 325
34. The Many Uses of “Good” 331
35. Ends: Rational or Reasonable? 345
36. Contributors/Addresses 359
37. Name Index 361
38. Subject Index 365
39. 371-372 371