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22 Violent Nonstate Exploitation of Commercial Drones

  • Kerry Chávez and Ori Swed
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De Gruyter Handbook of Drone Warfare
This chapter is in the book De Gruyter Handbook of Drone Warfare

Abstract

In the last decade, many violent nonstate actors have attained crude airpower with homemade, commercial and, in some cases, military-grade drones. While early adoption was constrained to groups with higher capacity, around 2013 the rapid advancement of commercial unmanned aerial system technology enabled a broad, diverse, and growing range of militant groups to harness them. Now, groups of manifold goals - terrorists, insurgents, rebels, cartels, criminal syndicates, extremists - use them to advance their agendas. The phenomenon is as geographically spread as ideologically, occurring in every region except Antarctica. The reason for this surge in malign drone use mirrors those of licit nonstate users: commercial drones are feasible and effective. As the industry expanded, these platforms became increasingly affordable and sophisticated. Flexible for multiuse functions, they can replace or reduce risk to manpower, yield intelligence to support operations, and serve as weapons from an aerial vantage point where many targets have not developed defensive measures. Each of these factors is critical for violent nonstate actors vying against stronger states and other nonstate competitors. The most common application is for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Militant groups also use them for target acquisition, propaganda, to disrupt enemy forces and broader political and economic processes, and for weaponized attacks. Already a security concern in several venues, we anticipate that the malign drone threat will grow in use, innovation, and complexity. We conclude with some prescriptions, emphasizing early mitigation, technological solutions, and training.

Abstract

In the last decade, many violent nonstate actors have attained crude airpower with homemade, commercial and, in some cases, military-grade drones. While early adoption was constrained to groups with higher capacity, around 2013 the rapid advancement of commercial unmanned aerial system technology enabled a broad, diverse, and growing range of militant groups to harness them. Now, groups of manifold goals - terrorists, insurgents, rebels, cartels, criminal syndicates, extremists - use them to advance their agendas. The phenomenon is as geographically spread as ideologically, occurring in every region except Antarctica. The reason for this surge in malign drone use mirrors those of licit nonstate users: commercial drones are feasible and effective. As the industry expanded, these platforms became increasingly affordable and sophisticated. Flexible for multiuse functions, they can replace or reduce risk to manpower, yield intelligence to support operations, and serve as weapons from an aerial vantage point where many targets have not developed defensive measures. Each of these factors is critical for violent nonstate actors vying against stronger states and other nonstate competitors. The most common application is for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Militant groups also use them for target acquisition, propaganda, to disrupt enemy forces and broader political and economic processes, and for weaponized attacks. Already a security concern in several venues, we anticipate that the malign drone threat will grow in use, innovation, and complexity. We conclude with some prescriptions, emphasizing early mitigation, technological solutions, and training.

Chapters in this book

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Contents V
  3. 1 Introduction: Why Study Drones? 1
  4. Part 1: Approaches to the Study of Drone Warfare
  5. 2 What Is Drone Warfare? 9
  6. 3 Defining Drones 25
  7. 4 Drones and International Law 41
  8. 5 Drone Imaginaries 57
  9. 6 A Gendering of Drones 69
  10. 7 Critiquing Drone Warfare 87
  11. Part 2: The First Drone Age
  12. 8 What Is ‘The First Drone Age’? 107
  13. 9 Drone Pilots: The Struggles of War by Remote Control 111
  14. 10 The Post-9/11 Era: Drones and Just War Theory 125
  15. 11 The CIA Drone Program 141
  16. 12 Drones and Civilian Harm 159
  17. 13 Drone Warfare and Public Opinion 177
  18. 14 Living Under Drones 197
  19. 15 The Media and Drone Warfare 215
  20. Part 3: The Second Drone Age
  21. 16 What is ‘The Second Drone Age’? 237
  22. 17 The Islamic State Drone Program 243
  23. 18 The Use of Drones in West Africa and the Sahel 255
  24. 19 China’s Drone Diplomacy 267
  25. 20 Russian Military Drones: Established and Emerging Technologies in Ukraine 285
  26. 21 Europe’s Military Drone Problem 299
  27. 22 Violent Nonstate Exploitation of Commercial Drones 313
  28. 23 Game-Changing Drones? The Record from Libya to Ukraine 325
  29. Part 4: A Third Drone Age? Concerns and Visions for the Future
  30. Concerns
  31. 24 Domestic Drones and Domestic Threat: Urban Life in the Drone Age 343
  32. 25 Autonomous Drones 369
  33. 26 Swarming Drones 385
  34. 27 Countering Unmanned Aircraft Systems 399
  35. Visions
  36. 28 The Diffusion of Drone Warfare – A Ten Year Review 421
  37. 29 Drones: A Unique Danger to International Law 437
  38. 30 Drone Proliferation and IR Theory: Visions for the Future 453
  39. Contributors to this Volume 475
  40. Index 485
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