Startseite Philosophie Franz Brentano’s Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology
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Franz Brentano’s Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology

  • Andreea Eșanu
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Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Brentano and the Positive Philosophy of Comte and Mill

Abstract

A topic only marginally addressed in Brentano scholarship is his view (or views) of induction as the proper method of establishing, deriving and verifying psychological laws. Here, I confine my discussion to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Brentano’s genetic psychology (discussed in the first part of his Descriptive Psychology). In both of these accounts, Brentano’s view of induction is empiricist: the laws of empirical/genetic psychology, i. e., of a “very comprehensive universality,” are empirical generalizations derived from and verified only by experience. But genetic psychology is perhaps the most interesting case: its intended reliance on probabilities and statistical verification resembles a science on the right path to progress, with fair control of its uncertainties. Nevertheless, by contrast with more mature mathematized sciences (like classical mechanics), genetic psychology is still a long way behind, due mainly to its insufficient mathematization-a difficulty which, according to Brentano, precludes its deductive closure.

Abstract

A topic only marginally addressed in Brentano scholarship is his view (or views) of induction as the proper method of establishing, deriving and verifying psychological laws. Here, I confine my discussion to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and Brentano’s genetic psychology (discussed in the first part of his Descriptive Psychology). In both of these accounts, Brentano’s view of induction is empiricist: the laws of empirical/genetic psychology, i. e., of a “very comprehensive universality,” are empirical generalizations derived from and verified only by experience. But genetic psychology is perhaps the most interesting case: its intended reliance on probabilities and statistical verification resembles a science on the right path to progress, with fair control of its uncertainties. Nevertheless, by contrast with more mature mathematized sciences (like classical mechanics), genetic psychology is still a long way behind, due mainly to its insufficient mathematization-a difficulty which, according to Brentano, precludes its deductive closure.

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Comte, Mill, and Brentano on the Intellectual Status of Philosophy and Its Relationship to History 9
  6. Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of “Inner Observation” and the Constitution of the “Systematic View of the Soul” 31
  7. Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte: The Theory of Stages and the Psychology 45
  8. Comte and Brentano: Elements for a Theory of Decline 139
  9. Can We Have Scientific Knowledge About God? Brentano on Comte’s Metaphysical Skepticism 165
  10. Intentionality and the Classification of Phenomena and Sciences in Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive and in Brentano’s Empirical Psychology 185
  11. Brentano’s View about Natural Science and Methodological Phenomenalism. A Comparison with John Stuart Mill’s Approach 223
  12. The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano 245
  13. Franz Brentano’s Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology 265
  14. Hume’s “Bundle of Perceptions” and the “Problem of the I” in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 279
  15. Brentano’s Mathematical Foundation of Science 309
  16. Franz Brentano on the Errors of Mach’s Positivism: Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic 331
  17. On the Brentanian Legacy in Twardowski’s Views on Psychology 351
  18. Descriptive and Intentional Contents. Considerations on Husserl’s Logical Investigations from Brentano’s Empirical Point of View 371
  19. Brentano’s Four Phases and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy in the Light of His Relation to His Students 401
  20. Brentano in Exile: The Brentano Institute at Oxford 415
  21. Appendix: The Idea of Philosophy as Science in Brentano
  22. Habilitation Theses 1866 433
  23. Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy 1869 437
  24. Introduction to the Concept of the History of Philosophy 457
  25. On the Law of Historical Development 475
  26. Philosophy of the History of Philosophy 485
  27. On the Reasons for a Loss of Confidence in the Area of Philosophy 489
  28. On Schelling’s Philosophy 501
  29. On the Future of Philosophy 523
  30. My Parting Wishes for Austria 1894 571
  31. Index 591
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110734645-011

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Frontmatter I
  2. Table of Contents V
  3. List of Abbreviations IX
  4. Introduction 1
  5. Comte, Mill, and Brentano on the Intellectual Status of Philosophy and Its Relationship to History 9
  6. Comte on Psychology: The Criticism of “Inner Observation” and the Constitution of the “Systematic View of the Soul” 31
  7. Franz Brentano and Auguste Comte: The Theory of Stages and the Psychology 45
  8. Comte and Brentano: Elements for a Theory of Decline 139
  9. Can We Have Scientific Knowledge About God? Brentano on Comte’s Metaphysical Skepticism 165
  10. Intentionality and the Classification of Phenomena and Sciences in Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive and in Brentano’s Empirical Psychology 185
  11. Brentano’s View about Natural Science and Methodological Phenomenalism. A Comparison with John Stuart Mill’s Approach 223
  12. The Reception of Positivism in Whewell, Mill and Brentano 245
  13. Franz Brentano’s Multifaceted View of Induction in Empirical and Genetic Psychology 265
  14. Hume’s “Bundle of Perceptions” and the “Problem of the I” in Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 279
  15. Brentano’s Mathematical Foundation of Science 309
  16. Franz Brentano on the Errors of Mach’s Positivism: Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic 331
  17. On the Brentanian Legacy in Twardowski’s Views on Psychology 351
  18. Descriptive and Intentional Contents. Considerations on Husserl’s Logical Investigations from Brentano’s Empirical Point of View 371
  19. Brentano’s Four Phases and the Rise of Scientific Philosophy in the Light of His Relation to His Students 401
  20. Brentano in Exile: The Brentano Institute at Oxford 415
  21. Appendix: The Idea of Philosophy as Science in Brentano
  22. Habilitation Theses 1866 433
  23. Auguste Comte and Positive Philosophy 1869 437
  24. Introduction to the Concept of the History of Philosophy 457
  25. On the Law of Historical Development 475
  26. Philosophy of the History of Philosophy 485
  27. On the Reasons for a Loss of Confidence in the Area of Philosophy 489
  28. On Schelling’s Philosophy 501
  29. On the Future of Philosophy 523
  30. My Parting Wishes for Austria 1894 571
  31. Index 591
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Heruntergeladen am 9.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110734645-011/html
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