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Auch für Gott: Finitude, Phenomenology, and Anthropology

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Phenomenology to the Letter
This chapter is in the book Phenomenology to the Letter

Abstract

In his magnum opus, Au coeur de la raison: la phénoménologie, Claude Romano develops a phenomenological theory of essence, which, unlike Husserl’s, is avowedly anthropological. Material a priori necessities, Romano insists, are only conditionally necessary. They only determine how human beings experience phenomena. They do not determine how God, angels, and other nonhuman species of consciousness experience phenomena. Despite Romano’s legitimate concerns about Husserl’s denial of anthropologism, his own embrace of anthropologism creates problems of its own. On the one hand, Romano asserts that material a priori necessities do not depend on the linguistic conventions of contingent historical communities. On the other hand, he reintroduces relativity at a more general, “species” level. Romano’s anthropologism restores (wittingly or not) the Kantian thesis that there are unknowable “things in themselves,” and any such thesis is absurd, at least according to Husserl. In short, in his theory of essence Romano maintains two mutually contradictory theses: on the one hand, the negation of material a priori necessities is inconceivable, but on the other, these necessities are only conditional, and so their negation must be conceivable.

Abstract

In his magnum opus, Au coeur de la raison: la phénoménologie, Claude Romano develops a phenomenological theory of essence, which, unlike Husserl’s, is avowedly anthropological. Material a priori necessities, Romano insists, are only conditionally necessary. They only determine how human beings experience phenomena. They do not determine how God, angels, and other nonhuman species of consciousness experience phenomena. Despite Romano’s legitimate concerns about Husserl’s denial of anthropologism, his own embrace of anthropologism creates problems of its own. On the one hand, Romano asserts that material a priori necessities do not depend on the linguistic conventions of contingent historical communities. On the other hand, he reintroduces relativity at a more general, “species” level. Romano’s anthropologism restores (wittingly or not) the Kantian thesis that there are unknowable “things in themselves,” and any such thesis is absurd, at least according to Husserl. In short, in his theory of essence Romano maintains two mutually contradictory theses: on the one hand, the negation of material a priori necessities is inconceivable, but on the other, these necessities are only conditional, and so their negation must be conceivable.

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