Startseite Philosophie Der eine „Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ und die vielen „Kategorien der Freiheit“
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Der eine „Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft“ und die vielen „Kategorien der Freiheit“

  • Wolfgang Bartuschat
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Abstract

This paper develops an interpretation of the passage in the Critique of Practical Reason,which is dedicated to the „categories of freedom“, byconsidering and discussing in more detail the context in which it is located. That is what Kant calls the „Second Chapter“ of the analytic of pure practical reason. My thesis is that this entire chapter serves as a demarcation of the, as Kant puts it there, „empiricism concerning practical reason“, that in emphasising this demarcation the typic-subchapter is a „comment“ on the „Second Chapter“ and, finally, that also the passages which deal with the categories of freedom are to be read in this respect. As a result this means, that the categories of freedom have their actual place only in the Metaphysics of Morals: in the application of the pure principles of reason to objects of desire given to moral reason, which reason has to recognise, and to which it has to respond without having to bow before it.

Abstract

This paper develops an interpretation of the passage in the Critique of Practical Reason,which is dedicated to the „categories of freedom“, byconsidering and discussing in more detail the context in which it is located. That is what Kant calls the „Second Chapter“ of the analytic of pure practical reason. My thesis is that this entire chapter serves as a demarcation of the, as Kant puts it there, „empiricism concerning practical reason“, that in emphasising this demarcation the typic-subchapter is a „comment“ on the „Second Chapter“ and, finally, that also the passages which deal with the categories of freedom are to be read in this respect. As a result this means, that the categories of freedom have their actual place only in the Metaphysics of Morals: in the application of the pure principles of reason to objects of desire given to moral reason, which reason has to recognise, and to which it has to respond without having to bow before it.

Heruntergeladen am 23.10.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110491135-014/html
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