4. Wittgenstein and the failure of the Theory of Knowledge

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents 5
3. Introduction 7
4. Part I. Falsehood, negation, and logical constants
5. 1. Russell: from the binary to the multiple-relation theory of judgment 13
6. 2. The reasons leading to the multiple-relation theory of judgment 30
7. 3. Meinong and Russell on being and existence 43
8. 4. Wittgenstein on bivalence and bipolarity 53
9. 5. Russell on negation 59
10. 6. Wittgenstein (and Russell) on negation and bipolarity 68
11. 7. Sense, meaning, and Sachverhalte 90
12. 8. Symmetry and asymmetry between true and false 112
13. 9. The Grundgedanke: Wittgenstein on logical constants 124
14. 10. Molecularity and Sachlage 130
15. Part II. Facts
16. 1. Russell and Bradley: the unity of the proposition and the doubleaspect problems 143
17. 2. Difficulties and further developments of the multiple-relation theory of judgment 155
18. 3. Judgment and logical form 170
19. 4. Wittgenstein and the failure of the Theory of Knowledge 192
20. 5. Facts, things, and bipolarity 205
21. 6. Troubles with Sachverhalte 225
22. 7. The nature of the proposition 243
23. 8. Pictures, propositions, thoughts, and projection 265
24. Part III. Objects and form
25. 1. Atomism and objects 297
26. 2. Relations, objects, and form 309
27. 3. Sense and nonsense 332
28. 4. Russell and Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy 349
29. References 359
30. Backmatter 155