Contents

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter I
2. Contents V
3. Preface XIII
4. 1 Perspectives on Modeling International Conflict 1
5. Part 1 Game Theoretic and Utility Approaches
6. 2 The Path to Stable Deterrence 9
7. 3 Anticipation and Stability in Two-Person Non-Cooperative Games 26
8. 4 The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence 52
9. 5. Decision-Theoretic and Game-Theoretic Models of International Conflict 76
10. 6 Moving Forward in Time: Paths Toward a Dynamic Utility Theory of Crisis Decisions 112
11. Part 2 Escalation Processes
12. 7 Heuristic Decision Rules, the Dynamics of the Arms Race, and War Initiation 131
13. 8 Arms Races as Good Things? 161
14. 9 Transform Methods and Dynamic Models 175
15. 10. The Dollar Auction as a Model of International Escalation 220
16. Part 3 Simulation Approaches
17. 11 Toward a Dynamic Theory of Conflict and Coalition Formation 227
18. 12 Modeling External and Internal Conflict in Small Countries 251
19. 13 Simulation of Reliability Kinematics in Political Systems 278
20. Part 4 Models of War Fighting
21. 14 Lanchester Models of Battlefield Attrition and the Organization of Combat Forces 317
22. 15 Dynamic Models of Guerrilla Warfare 354
23. Part 5 Artificial Intelligence Approaches
24. 16 Adaptive Precedent-Based Logic and Rational Choice: A Comparison of Two Approaches to the Modeling of International Behavior 371
25. 17 Changes in Foreign Policy Across Time: The Logical Analysis of a Succession of Decision Problems Using Logic Programming 401
26. Part 6 Empirical and Theoretical Frontiers
27. 18 A Visual Approach to International Conflict and Cooperation 425
28. 19 Cycles of General, Hegemonic, and Global War 462
29. 20. Forecasting East-West Diplomatic Climate: A Politometric Approach 489
30. Part 7 Commentary
31. 21 Connecting Domestic and International Conflicts, Past and Present 515
32. References 533
33. About the Editors and Contributors 559