Temporal Realism and the R-Theory

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter I
2. Table of Contents 5
3. Foreword 7
4. Two Arguments against Antirealism in Relation to Artefact Kinds 9
5. Realism, Tense, and Context Sensitivity 29
6. Proof of the Existence of Universals —from a Fallibilist 51
7. Methodological Cartesianism 63
8. The Transparency Objection against Modal Anti-Realism and the Paradox of Conceivability 99
9. Temporal Realism and the R-Theory 123
10. Was Frege a Realist? And, if so, in What Sense? 141
11. Is Exemplification Absurd? A Note on Lowe’s Criticism 197
12. Why Realism Needs Ontology 201
13. The Impossibility of Philosophical Skepticism 213
14. Metaphysical Realism and Castañeda’s Minimal Transcendental Realism 235
15. Realism and Intentionality 247
16. Defending Deployment Realism against Alleged Counterexamples 265
17. Fiction in Science? Exploring the Reality of Theoretical Entities 291
18. Does Bell’s Theorem Imply Metaphysical Realism? 311
19. Semantic Antirealism: Last Gasp 323
20. The Reality of Linguistic Norms or Linguistic Rules Rule 341
21. On Russell’s Robust Sense of Reality 363
22. Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs 379
23. Realism versus Idealism in the Nature-Nurture Dispute 401
24. What Does Realism Entail for the Humanist? 417