Contents

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Acknowledgments ix
4. Abbreviations xiii
5. Introduction: When Do Threats Work? 1
6. 1. The Assurance Dilemma: Credible and Conditional Threats 9
7. 2. “I at Least Want to Be Guilty”: Coercing South Africa into a Corner 32
8. 3. “Sanctions with Inspectors”: Convincing Iraq to Come Clean 57
9. 4. “They Will Laugh at Us”: Coaxing Libya to Confess 78
10. 5. “We Knew That They Knew We Knew”: Compelling Iran to Concede 106
11. Conclusion: The True Sources of Coercive Leverage 144
12. Notes 165
13. References 209
14. Index 227