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Chapter
Open Access
Introduction: When Do Threats Work?
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments ix
- Abbreviations xiii
- Introduction: When Do Threats Work? 1
- 1. The Assurance Dilemma: Credible and Conditional Threats 9
- 2. “I at Least Want to Be Guilty”: Coercing South Africa into a Corner 32
- 3. “Sanctions with Inspectors”: Convincing Iraq to Come Clean 57
- 4. “They Will Laugh at Us”: Coaxing Libya to Confess 78
- 5. “We Knew That They Knew We Knew”: Compelling Iran to Concede 106
- Conclusion: The True Sources of Coercive Leverage 144
- Notes 165
- References 209
- Index 227
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments ix
- Abbreviations xiii
- Introduction: When Do Threats Work? 1
- 1. The Assurance Dilemma: Credible and Conditional Threats 9
- 2. “I at Least Want to Be Guilty”: Coercing South Africa into a Corner 32
- 3. “Sanctions with Inspectors”: Convincing Iraq to Come Clean 57
- 4. “They Will Laugh at Us”: Coaxing Libya to Confess 78
- 5. “We Knew That They Knew We Knew”: Compelling Iran to Concede 106
- Conclusion: The True Sources of Coercive Leverage 144
- Notes 165
- References 209
- Index 227
