The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location
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Dan Zeman
Abstract
In this paper I inquire into the methodological status of one of the arguments that have figured prominently in contemporary debates about the semantics of a variety of expressions, the so-called “Binding Argument”. My inquiry is limited to the case of meteorological sentences like “It is raining”, but my conclusion can be extended to other types of sentences as well. Following Jason Stanley, I distinguish between three interpretations of the argument. My focus is on the third, weakest interpretation, according to which postulating variables for locations in the logical form of meteorological sentences is the best available explanation of the binding phenomena that such sentences give rise to. My aim is to show that even in this weak interpretation, the argument cannot be reasonably taken to hold. I accomplish this by showcasing several alternative ways to account for the binding data that have not been, as of yet, ruled out as flawed.
Abstract
In this paper I inquire into the methodological status of one of the arguments that have figured prominently in contemporary debates about the semantics of a variety of expressions, the so-called “Binding Argument”. My inquiry is limited to the case of meteorological sentences like “It is raining”, but my conclusion can be extended to other types of sentences as well. Following Jason Stanley, I distinguish between three interpretations of the argument. My focus is on the third, weakest interpretation, according to which postulating variables for locations in the logical form of meteorological sentences is the best available explanation of the binding phenomena that such sentences give rise to. My aim is to show that even in this weak interpretation, the argument cannot be reasonably taken to hold. I accomplish this by showcasing several alternative ways to account for the binding data that have not been, as of yet, ruled out as flawed.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Introduction 1
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Part 1: The contextual turn and the case for reference, truth-conditions and meaning
- Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics 13
- Full but not saturated: The myth of mandatory primary pragmatic processes 31
- How to get lost in context: Searle on context, content and literal meaning 51
- Meaning and interpretation 75
- The role of context in semantics: A Relevance Theory perspective 91
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Part 2: The contextual turn and the case for language use
- Boo semantics: Radical nonfactualism and non truth-conditional meaning 117
- Metaphor and mercurial content 141
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Part 3: The contextual turn and the case of analysis
- Context, two-dimensional semantics and conceptual analysis 171
- The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location 191
- Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding 213
- Contributors 227
- Index 229
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Contents v
- Introduction 1
-
Part 1: The contextual turn and the case for reference, truth-conditions and meaning
- Open texture and schematicity as arguments for non-referential semantics 13
- Full but not saturated: The myth of mandatory primary pragmatic processes 31
- How to get lost in context: Searle on context, content and literal meaning 51
- Meaning and interpretation 75
- The role of context in semantics: A Relevance Theory perspective 91
-
Part 2: The contextual turn and the case for language use
- Boo semantics: Radical nonfactualism and non truth-conditional meaning 117
- Metaphor and mercurial content 141
-
Part 3: The contextual turn and the case of analysis
- Context, two-dimensional semantics and conceptual analysis 171
- The use of the Binding Argument in the debate about location 191
- Slices of meaning: Levels of analysis and the unity of understanding 213
- Contributors 227
- Index 229
