2 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory

Kapitel in diesem Buch

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. Preface xiii
4. Part 1. Voting Procedures
5. 1 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice 3
6. 2 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory 23
7. 3 Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference 46
8. 4 Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting 69
9. 5 Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure 89
10. 6 Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation 112
11. 7 Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections 143
12. Part 2. Fair- Division Procedures
13. 8 Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament 173
14. 9 Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament 199
15. 10 Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst- Off or Avoid Envy? 224
16. 11 Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide- the- Dollar 252
17. 12 Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner 271
18. 13 Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake 289
19. 14 Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods 305
20. 15 Summary and Conclusions 329
21. Glossary 337
22. References 343
23. Index 363