Mathematics and Democracy
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Steven J. Brams
and Steven J. Brams
About this book
Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly.
One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.
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Frontmatter
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Contents
vii -
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Preface
xiii - Part 1. Voting Procedures
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1 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice
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2 Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Theory
23 -
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3 Electing a Single Winner: Combining Approval and Preference
46 -
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4 Electing Multiple Winners: Constrained Approval Voting
69 -
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5 Electing Multiple Winners: The Minimax Procedure
89 -
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6 Electing Multiple Winners: Minimizing Misrepresentation
112 -
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7 Selecting Winners in Multiple Elections
143 - Part 2. Fair- Division Procedures
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8 Selecting a Governing Coalition in a Parliament
173 -
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9 Allocating Cabinet Ministries in a Parliament
199 -
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10 Allocating Indivisible Goods: Help the Worst- Off or Avoid Envy?
224 -
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11 Allocating a Single Homogeneous Divisible Good: Divide- the- Dollar
252 -
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12 Allocating Multiple Homogeneous Divisible Goods: Adjusted Winner
271 -
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13 Allocating a Single Heterogeneous Good: Cutting a Cake
289 -
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14 Allocating Divisible and Indivisible Goods
305 -
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15 Summary and Conclusions
329 -
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Glossary
337 -
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References
343 -
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Index
363