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The Origins of These Essays
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Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- The Origins of These Essays ix
- Introduction 1
-
PART ONE. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes
- ESSAY ONE. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33
- ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can’t Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72
- ESSAY THREE. Belief and Mental Representation 81
- ESSAY FOUR. Attitudes and Anaphora 111
-
PART TWO. Modality
- ESSAY FIVE. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139
- ESSAY SIX. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165
- ESSAY SEVEN. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189
- ESSAY EIGHT. Understanding Assertion 211
- ESSAY NINE. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243
- ESSAY TEN. Actually 277
-
PART THREE. Truth and Vagueness
- ESSAY ELEVEN. What Is a Theory of Truth? 303
- ESSAY TWELVE. Understanding Deflationism 323
- ESSAY THIRTEEN. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340
- ESSAY FOURTEEN. The Possibility of Partial Definition 362
-
PART FOUR. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule
- ESSAY FIFTEEN. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385
- ESSAY SIXTEEN. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416
- Index 457
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- The Origins of These Essays ix
- Introduction 1
-
PART ONE. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes
- ESSAY ONE. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33
- ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can’t Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72
- ESSAY THREE. Belief and Mental Representation 81
- ESSAY FOUR. Attitudes and Anaphora 111
-
PART TWO. Modality
- ESSAY FIVE. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139
- ESSAY SIX. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165
- ESSAY SEVEN. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189
- ESSAY EIGHT. Understanding Assertion 211
- ESSAY NINE. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243
- ESSAY TEN. Actually 277
-
PART THREE. Truth and Vagueness
- ESSAY ELEVEN. What Is a Theory of Truth? 303
- ESSAY TWELVE. Understanding Deflationism 323
- ESSAY THIRTEEN. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340
- ESSAY FOURTEEN. The Possibility of Partial Definition 362
-
PART FOUR. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule
- ESSAY FIFTEEN. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385
- ESSAY SIXTEEN. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416
- Index 457