ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can’t Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances

Chapters in this book

1. Frontmatter i
2. Contents vii
3. The Origins of These Essays ix
4. Introduction 1
5. PART ONE. Reference, Propositions, and Propositional Attitudes
6. ESSAY ONE. Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content 33
7. ESSAY TWO. Why Propositions Can’t Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances 72
8. ESSAY THREE. Belief and Mental Representation 81
9. ESSAY FOUR. Attitudes and Anaphora 111
10. PART TWO. Modality
11. ESSAY FIVE. The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified Descriptions 139
12. ESSAY SIX. The Philosophical Significance of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori 165
13. ESSAY SEVEN. Knowledge of Manifest Natural Kinds 189
14. ESSAY EIGHT. Understanding Assertion 211
15. ESSAY NINE. Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 243
16. ESSAY TEN. Actually 277
17. PART THREE. Truth and Vagueness
18. ESSAY ELEVEN. What Is a Theory of Truth? 303
19. ESSAY TWELVE. Understanding Deflationism 323
20. ESSAY THIRTEEN. Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates 340
21. ESSAY FOURTEEN. The Possibility of Partial Definition 362
22. PART FOUR. Kripke, Wittgenstein, and Following a Rule
23. ESSAY FIFTEEN. Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox 385
24. ESSAY SIXTEEN. Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule-Following Paradox 416
25. Index 457