Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
-
Zhaofeng Wang
Abstract
Corporations controlled by the Chinese government originated as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and still constitute the foundation of the Chinese economy. In addition to their profit-maximization goal, they are expected to contribute to the national welfare, maintain a harmonious society, and ensure sustainable economic development. They thus pursue both firm goals and national goals. This dual goal has shaped corporate governance under state control. While Chinese SOE performance has improved in recent years, certain problems remain. This Article suggests how the governance of these firms can be reformed in line with their dual goal.
©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Introduction
- Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
- Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
- Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
- Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
- Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
- The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
- Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
- Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
- State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
- Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
- Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Article
- Introduction
- Governments as Investors of Last Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies
- Bank Nationalizations of the 1930s in Italy: The IRI Formula
- Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation
- Why Power Companies Build Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: The Case of Japan
- Corporate Governance under State Control: The Chinese Experience
- The Unintended Consequences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience
- Can Company Disclosures Discipline State-Appointed Managers? Evidence from Greek Privatizations
- Hidden Government Influence over Privatized Banks
- State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board Composition
- Hidden Costs of Mandatory Long-Term Compensation
- Global Investment Regulation and Sovereign Funds