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Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
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Werner Güth
Veröffentlicht/Copyright:
30. November 2019
Abstract
This paper analyzes blindfolded vs. informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Considering the transition from one information setting to another suggests that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition effect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining where task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean’ are implemented more frequently.
Published Online: 2019-11-30
Published in Print: 2017-12-20
© 2019 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston
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- Bounded Rationality in Principal-Agent Relationships
- Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
- How to Attract an Audience at a Conference: Paper, Person or Place?
- The Handelsblatt Rankings 2.0: Research Rankings for the Economics Profession in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland
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Artikel in diesem Heft
- Bounded Rationality in Principal-Agent Relationships
- Blindfolded vs. Informed Ultimatum Bargaining – A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
- How to Attract an Audience at a Conference: Paper, Person or Place?
- The Handelsblatt Rankings 2.0: Research Rankings for the Economics Profession in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland
- Handelsblatt Ranking and Journal Quality: A Cautionary Note
- Index: Volume 18, 2017
