Modes of modality in an Un-Cartesian framework
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Elisabeth Leiss
Abstract
The central aim of this paper is to show that Certainty as encoded by the linguistic means of epistemicity and evidentiality differs in essential ways form Certainty in metalinguistic terms (Objectivity). The paper starts with a presentation of the building blocks of the epistemic and evidential functions of the modal verbs in German. In such fully grammaticalized modal verb systems as in German, we find that the speaker is split into Source (of evidence) and Assessment (of evidence). In declaratives that are modalized by the epistemic/evidential use of modal verbs, utmost Certainty is achieved whenever the speaker’s mind is the source of evidence. When we take a close look at the linguistic means of encoding certainty, we have to state the paradox that the more subjectivity is involved, the more Certainty is achieved. This differs completely from the common-sense notion of Certainty, which is closely linked to objectivity. We find a way out of this dilemma when we take into account the difference between experience and knowledge. Epistemicity and evidentiality, as encoded by linguistic means, are based on subjective experience, whereas the notion of objective certainty is based on intersubjectivized knowledge. In contrast to experience, which is processed and stored by Episodic Memory, knowledge is processed by Semantic Memory. With respect to these different subgroups of Long-Term Memory, two neuropsychologically based qualities of Certainty are proposed.
Abstract
The central aim of this paper is to show that Certainty as encoded by the linguistic means of epistemicity and evidentiality differs in essential ways form Certainty in metalinguistic terms (Objectivity). The paper starts with a presentation of the building blocks of the epistemic and evidential functions of the modal verbs in German. In such fully grammaticalized modal verb systems as in German, we find that the speaker is split into Source (of evidence) and Assessment (of evidence). In declaratives that are modalized by the epistemic/evidential use of modal verbs, utmost Certainty is achieved whenever the speaker’s mind is the source of evidence. When we take a close look at the linguistic means of encoding certainty, we have to state the paradox that the more subjectivity is involved, the more Certainty is achieved. This differs completely from the common-sense notion of Certainty, which is closely linked to objectivity. We find a way out of this dilemma when we take into account the difference between experience and knowledge. Epistemicity and evidentiality, as encoded by linguistic means, are based on subjective experience, whereas the notion of objective certainty is based on intersubjectivized knowledge. In contrast to experience, which is processed and stored by Episodic Memory, knowledge is processed by Semantic Memory. With respect to these different subgroups of Long-Term Memory, two neuropsychologically based qualities of Certainty are proposed.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Preface ix
- Introduction 1
-
Certainty
- Certainty 29
- Modes of modality in an Un-Cartesian framework 47
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(Un)Certainty as attitudinality
- Counter-argumentation and modality 65
- Explanation as a certainty marker in persuasive dialogue 83
- How to deal with attitude strength in debating situations. A survey on forewarning, argument strength, repetition, and source credibility as mediators of uncertainty 97
- The role of subjective certainty in the epistemology of testimony 121
- Uncertainty in polar questions and certainty in answers? 135
- Lying as a scalar phenomenon 153
- Persuasion pragmatic strategies in L1/L2 Italian argument-ative speech 175
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Dialogical exchange and speech acts
- What do I know as yet? 185
- On polar questions, negation, and the syntactic encoding of epistemicity 199
- Epistemic uncertainty and the syntax of speech acts 217
- Discursive functions of evidentials and epistemic modals 239
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Onomasiology
- Vagueness, unspecificity, and approximation. Cognitive and lexical aspects in English, Swedish, and Italian 265
- Latin commitment-markers 285
- Italian come se “as if” 297
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Applications in exegesis and religious discourse
- The communication of certainty/uncertainty within a Gospel passage (John 9:1-41) 327
- Rhetorics of (un)certainty in religious discourse 343
- Subject index 363
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Preface ix
- Introduction 1
-
Certainty
- Certainty 29
- Modes of modality in an Un-Cartesian framework 47
-
(Un)Certainty as attitudinality
- Counter-argumentation and modality 65
- Explanation as a certainty marker in persuasive dialogue 83
- How to deal with attitude strength in debating situations. A survey on forewarning, argument strength, repetition, and source credibility as mediators of uncertainty 97
- The role of subjective certainty in the epistemology of testimony 121
- Uncertainty in polar questions and certainty in answers? 135
- Lying as a scalar phenomenon 153
- Persuasion pragmatic strategies in L1/L2 Italian argument-ative speech 175
-
Dialogical exchange and speech acts
- What do I know as yet? 185
- On polar questions, negation, and the syntactic encoding of epistemicity 199
- Epistemic uncertainty and the syntax of speech acts 217
- Discursive functions of evidentials and epistemic modals 239
-
Onomasiology
- Vagueness, unspecificity, and approximation. Cognitive and lexical aspects in English, Swedish, and Italian 265
- Latin commitment-markers 285
- Italian come se “as if” 297
-
Applications in exegesis and religious discourse
- The communication of certainty/uncertainty within a Gospel passage (John 9:1-41) 327
- Rhetorics of (un)certainty in religious discourse 343
- Subject index 363
