Chapter 6. Interpreting or in legal texts
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Jacqueline Visconti
Abstract
Reconstructing the meaning of a text is a complex operation, involving linguistic, situational, inter-textual, cognitive, cultural, and ideological parameters. Due to a well-known polarization in contemporary linguistic theory, the interpretation process spans between an abstract “linguistic” meaning and a concrete “communicative” meaning. The former is the result of combining the meanings of the lexical units following the rules of syntax and punctuation, while the latter results from inferential processes, where linguistic meaning is taken as a point of departure and enriched with further information. The distinction between linguistic and communicative meaning maps onto the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, the conventional meaning of linguistic units vs. the meaning inferred through the interaction of linguistic meaning with context (Hansen 2008: 12ff.; Visconti 2014: 247ff.).
This chapter focuses on court decisions, a type of text in decisions, the interplay between semantics and pragmatics is particularly striking. It will investigate the way in which the interpreter, i.e. the judge, takes the linguistic meaning as an input (a set of instructions) and enriches it with further information by means of prepositions or connectives, which are often neglected in the legal literature, despite playing a crucial role in steering the interpretation.
Judges often engage in various types of linguistic analysis. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has exhibited both surprising linguistic acumen and, on the other hand, woeful disregard for how language operates in real life situations. Of course, there is not always a single correct linguistic analysis of legislative texts or conspiratorial conversations. Additionally, factors other than language are often relevant in determining the meaning of legal language; these factors are particularly relevant when the text is incomplete or ambiguous. But when interpreting a text, be it statutory or conversational, a careful linguistic analysis should always be the point of departure.
(Peter M. Tiersma, “The Judge as Linguist”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 27: 269, 1993, p. 283)
Abstract
Reconstructing the meaning of a text is a complex operation, involving linguistic, situational, inter-textual, cognitive, cultural, and ideological parameters. Due to a well-known polarization in contemporary linguistic theory, the interpretation process spans between an abstract “linguistic” meaning and a concrete “communicative” meaning. The former is the result of combining the meanings of the lexical units following the rules of syntax and punctuation, while the latter results from inferential processes, where linguistic meaning is taken as a point of departure and enriched with further information. The distinction between linguistic and communicative meaning maps onto the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, the conventional meaning of linguistic units vs. the meaning inferred through the interaction of linguistic meaning with context (Hansen 2008: 12ff.; Visconti 2014: 247ff.).
This chapter focuses on court decisions, a type of text in decisions, the interplay between semantics and pragmatics is particularly striking. It will investigate the way in which the interpreter, i.e. the judge, takes the linguistic meaning as an input (a set of instructions) and enriches it with further information by means of prepositions or connectives, which are often neglected in the legal literature, despite playing a crucial role in steering the interpretation.
Judges often engage in various types of linguistic analysis. The United States Supreme Court, for example, has exhibited both surprising linguistic acumen and, on the other hand, woeful disregard for how language operates in real life situations. Of course, there is not always a single correct linguistic analysis of legislative texts or conspiratorial conversations. Additionally, factors other than language are often relevant in determining the meaning of legal language; these factors are particularly relevant when the text is incomplete or ambiguous. But when interpreting a text, be it statutory or conversational, a careful linguistic analysis should always be the point of departure.
(Peter M. Tiersma, “The Judge as Linguist”, Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, Vol. 27: 269, 1993, p. 283)
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction 1
-
Part 1. Historical pragmatics
- Chapter 1. Pleading for life 21
- Chapter 2. “How came you not to cry out?” 41
- Chapter 3. Implicatures in Early Modern English courtroom records 65
- Chapter 4. Literal interpretation and political expediency 81
-
Part 2. Pragmatics of legal writing and documents
- Chapter 5. Making legal language clear to legal laypersons 101
- Chapter 6. Interpreting or in legal texts 117
-
Part 3. Discourse in the courtroom and in police investigation
- Chapter 7. The nature of power and control in the interrogative patterns of selected Nigerian courtroom discourse 133
- Chapter 8. The language of Egyptian interrogations 157
- Chapter 9. Achieving influence through negotiation 181
- Chapter 10. “I really don’t know because I’m stupid” 203
-
Part 4. Legal discourse and multilingualism
- Chapter 11. On the balance between invariance and context-dependence 231
- Chapter 12. Contextuality of interpretation in non-monolingual jurisdictions 257
- Legal pragmatics - subject index proposal 277
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents vii
- Introduction 1
-
Part 1. Historical pragmatics
- Chapter 1. Pleading for life 21
- Chapter 2. “How came you not to cry out?” 41
- Chapter 3. Implicatures in Early Modern English courtroom records 65
- Chapter 4. Literal interpretation and political expediency 81
-
Part 2. Pragmatics of legal writing and documents
- Chapter 5. Making legal language clear to legal laypersons 101
- Chapter 6. Interpreting or in legal texts 117
-
Part 3. Discourse in the courtroom and in police investigation
- Chapter 7. The nature of power and control in the interrogative patterns of selected Nigerian courtroom discourse 133
- Chapter 8. The language of Egyptian interrogations 157
- Chapter 9. Achieving influence through negotiation 181
- Chapter 10. “I really don’t know because I’m stupid” 203
-
Part 4. Legal discourse and multilingualism
- Chapter 11. On the balance between invariance and context-dependence 231
- Chapter 12. Contextuality of interpretation in non-monolingual jurisdictions 257
- Legal pragmatics - subject index proposal 277
