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Chapter 4. Literal interpretation and political expediency

The case of Thomas More
  • Dennis Kurzon
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Legal Pragmatics
Ein Kapitel aus dem Buch Legal Pragmatics

Abstract

In July 1535, the trial of Sir Thomas More took place, in which the ex-Lord Chancellor was accused, and found guilty, of high treason for not expressing support for two statutes passed in 1534, which formed the basis of Henry VIII’s constitutional and religious changes: the Act of Succession and the Act of Supremacy. One of the stipulations was the requirement for people to take an oath in support of these changes. More refused to take the oath, arguing that according to the literal interpretation of the statutes he could be found guilty of misprision [concealment] of treason only, and not of treason itself.

However, it will be argued, More misunderstood – or refused to understand – the ultimate purpose of the statutes, which may stem from his being a lawyer: he gave the statute a literal interpretation and ignored extralinguistic information, since such information does not play a role in interpretation, unless a literal interpretation would not make sense in the context (a possible precursor of Heydon’s Case of 1584).

Abstract

In July 1535, the trial of Sir Thomas More took place, in which the ex-Lord Chancellor was accused, and found guilty, of high treason for not expressing support for two statutes passed in 1534, which formed the basis of Henry VIII’s constitutional and religious changes: the Act of Succession and the Act of Supremacy. One of the stipulations was the requirement for people to take an oath in support of these changes. More refused to take the oath, arguing that according to the literal interpretation of the statutes he could be found guilty of misprision [concealment] of treason only, and not of treason itself.

However, it will be argued, More misunderstood – or refused to understand – the ultimate purpose of the statutes, which may stem from his being a lawyer: he gave the statute a literal interpretation and ignored extralinguistic information, since such information does not play a role in interpretation, unless a literal interpretation would not make sense in the context (a possible precursor of Heydon’s Case of 1584).

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents vii
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part 1. Historical pragmatics
  5. Chapter 1. Pleading for life 21
  6. Chapter 2. “How came you not to cry out?” 41
  7. Chapter 3. Implicatures in Early Modern English courtroom records 65
  8. Chapter 4. Literal interpretation and political expediency 81
  9. Part 2. Pragmatics of legal writing and documents
  10. Chapter 5. Making legal language clear to legal laypersons 101
  11. Chapter 6. Interpreting or in legal texts 117
  12. Part 3. Discourse in the courtroom and in police investigation
  13. Chapter 7. The nature of power and control in the interrogative patterns of selected Nigerian courtroom discourse 133
  14. Chapter 8. The language of Egyptian interrogations 157
  15. Chapter 9. Achieving influence through negotiation 181
  16. Chapter 10. “I really don’t know because I’m stupid” 203
  17. Part 4. Legal discourse and multilingualism
  18. Chapter 11. On the balance between invariance and context-dependence 231
  19. Chapter 12. Contextuality of interpretation in non-monolingual jurisdictions 257
  20. Legal pragmatics - subject index proposal 277
https://doi.org/10.1075/pbns.288.04kur

Kapitel in diesem Buch

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents vii
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part 1. Historical pragmatics
  5. Chapter 1. Pleading for life 21
  6. Chapter 2. “How came you not to cry out?” 41
  7. Chapter 3. Implicatures in Early Modern English courtroom records 65
  8. Chapter 4. Literal interpretation and political expediency 81
  9. Part 2. Pragmatics of legal writing and documents
  10. Chapter 5. Making legal language clear to legal laypersons 101
  11. Chapter 6. Interpreting or in legal texts 117
  12. Part 3. Discourse in the courtroom and in police investigation
  13. Chapter 7. The nature of power and control in the interrogative patterns of selected Nigerian courtroom discourse 133
  14. Chapter 8. The language of Egyptian interrogations 157
  15. Chapter 9. Achieving influence through negotiation 181
  16. Chapter 10. “I really don’t know because I’m stupid” 203
  17. Part 4. Legal discourse and multilingualism
  18. Chapter 11. On the balance between invariance and context-dependence 231
  19. Chapter 12. Contextuality of interpretation in non-monolingual jurisdictions 257
  20. Legal pragmatics - subject index proposal 277
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Heruntergeladen am 21.9.2025 von https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1075/pbns.288.04kur/html
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