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The self of shame

  • Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni
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Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity
This chapter is in the book Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity

Abstract

The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.

Abstract

The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” of shame- turns out to be the following: is there a common trait shared by all shame evaluations that will allow us to differentiate these evaluations from those that feature in other negative self-reflexive emotions like anger at oneself or self disappointment? Some progress is perhaps accomplished if we say that, in shame, a given trait or behavior is evaluated as degrading or as revealing one’s lack of worth. Still, even if we agree with this last claim, truth is that these answers are less illuminating than we might wish. A theory of shame should surely further elucidate the aspect of one’s identity relevant for shame, namely, the self of shame. In this connexion, philosophers have referred to “self-esteem,” “self-respect” or the “social self,” significantly disagreeing thus on which aspect of one’s identity is at stake in shame. After critically discussing the different solutions to the problem, we offer our own. Shame, we claim, consists in an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commitment that goes with holding self-relevant values. This conception solves the unity problem while illuminating other aspects of this emotion.

Chapters in this book

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents v
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
  5. Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
  6. The self of shame 33
  7. Authenticity and self-governance 51
  8. Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
  9. Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
  10. Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
  11. How to be “emotional”? 113
  12. Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
  13. Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
  14. Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
  15. Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
  16. Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
  17. Emotional optimality and moral force 215
  18. Index 235
https://doi.org/10.1075/ceb.5.04deo

Chapters in this book

  1. Prelim pages i
  2. Table of contents v
  3. Introduction 1
  4. Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
  5. Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
  6. The self of shame 33
  7. Authenticity and self-governance 51
  8. Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
  9. Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
  10. Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
  11. How to be “emotional”? 113
  12. Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
  13. Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
  14. Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
  15. Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
  16. Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
  17. Emotional optimality and moral force 215
  18. Index 235
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