Authentic emotions as ethical guides?
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Helena Flam
Abstract
Taking the feminist ethics of care and Taylor’s philosophy of the self as a point of departure, I pose the question whether emotions, as they postulate it, can be assumed to be “authentic” and in that capacity provide moral guidance. Relying on well-known sociological texts by Arlie Hochschild, Norbert Elias and Eva Illouz, I show that the violence-monopolizing nation-state along with the capitalist system of production and consumption have worked together to make us abandon, suppress, marginalize and modify what we possibly could refer to as “authentic” emotions. As a result, our emotional lives, if still open to “authentic” feelings at all, hang suspended between these and the cultural codes and rules prescribing what we should feel. Put even stronger, emotional ambivalence or schizophrenia is a typical phenomenon of our times, and thus emotions cannot be constitutive of our morals. I also point out that what Jaggar calls recalcitrant (and I call subversive) emotions are as constructed as conformist emotions. Taking side with Jaggar against Taylor, I suggest that the emancipatory potential of the (constructed) subversive emotions should be measured against the standard of human rights, rather than, as Taylor argues, in terms of everyday moral concerns.
Abstract
Taking the feminist ethics of care and Taylor’s philosophy of the self as a point of departure, I pose the question whether emotions, as they postulate it, can be assumed to be “authentic” and in that capacity provide moral guidance. Relying on well-known sociological texts by Arlie Hochschild, Norbert Elias and Eva Illouz, I show that the violence-monopolizing nation-state along with the capitalist system of production and consumption have worked together to make us abandon, suppress, marginalize and modify what we possibly could refer to as “authentic” emotions. As a result, our emotional lives, if still open to “authentic” feelings at all, hang suspended between these and the cultural codes and rules prescribing what we should feel. Put even stronger, emotional ambivalence or schizophrenia is a typical phenomenon of our times, and thus emotions cannot be constitutive of our morals. I also point out that what Jaggar calls recalcitrant (and I call subversive) emotions are as constructed as conformist emotions. Taking side with Jaggar against Taylor, I suggest that the emancipatory potential of the (constructed) subversive emotions should be measured against the standard of human rights, rather than, as Taylor argues, in terms of everyday moral concerns.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction 1
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Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
- Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
- The self of shame 33
- Authenticity and self-governance 51
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Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
- Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
- Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
- How to be “emotional”? 113
- Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
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Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
- Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
- Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
- Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
- Emotional optimality and moral force 215
- Index 235
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction 1
-
Part I. Authenticity, emotions, and the self
- Self-love and the structure of personal values 11
- The self of shame 33
- Authenticity and self-governance 51
-
Part II. Ramifications of emotional authenticity
- Picturing the authenticity of emotions 71
- Status, gender, and the politics of emotional authenticity 91
- How to be “emotional”? 113
- Authenticity and occupational emotions 133
-
Part III. Emotional authenticity in ethics and moral psychology
- Is emotivism more authentic than cognitivism? 155
- Emotional authenticity as a central basis of moral psychology 179
- Authentic emotions as ethical guides? 195
- Emotional optimality and moral force 215
- Index 235
