An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness
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Rick Dale
Abstract
We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selfhood, awareness, and conscious experience. The mechanisms that have been identified for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. The first is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic.
Abstract
We review theories and empirical research on underlying mechanisms of selfhood, awareness, and conscious experience. The mechanisms that have been identified for these phenomena are many and multifarious, lying at many levels of space and time, and complexity and abstractness. Proposals have included the global workspace for conscious information, action and its centrality to self awareness, the role for social information and narrative, and more. We argue that phenomenal experience, whatever it “really is,” is probably dependent upon all of these levels simultaneously. We end with two challenges for consciousness research. Both are couched in terms of the dynamics of phenomenal experience. The first is to investigate the sustained dynamics of phenomenal experience; the second is to unveil the way that multi-scale processes in the cognitive system interact to produce that richness of experience. We do not aim to solve the hard problem, but argue that any solution will require this plural characteristic.
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction vii
- Time after time 1
- Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 21
- From probabilities to percepts 37
- Being in time 81
- The (lack of) mental life of some machines 95
- Restless minds, wandering brains 121
- Fuzzy consciousness 149
- Two dynamical themes in Husserl 165
- Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 185
- The brain and its states 211
- An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 231
- Index 259
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction vii
- Time after time 1
- Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 21
- From probabilities to percepts 37
- Being in time 81
- The (lack of) mental life of some machines 95
- Restless minds, wandering brains 121
- Fuzzy consciousness 149
- Two dynamical themes in Husserl 165
- Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 185
- The brain and its states 211
- An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 231
- Index 259
