Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness
-
Rafael Malach
Abstract
For a neuroscientist working under the assumption of a complete correspondence between mind and brain, conscious awareness poses a profound mystery. It is a unique phenomenon in which a state of a physical system – i.e. a distributed pattern of neuronal activity is inexplicably transformed into an absolutely private and internal mental experience. Thus, the relevant point of view that needs to be taken when considering neuronal mechanisms underlying phenomenal experience must also be intrinsic – that of the brain’s neurons themselves. In contrast, the perspective taken by most neuroscience research examines neuronal activity from an external observer perspective. Here I will conjecture that the intrinsic perspective is implemented in the brain through rapid and recurrent neuronal activity – local neuronal “ignitions”. In this dynamics, the information about the state of a local neuronal assembly is distributed back to the neurons that form the assembly through recurrent activations. A conscious percept emerges when, through these neuronal reflections, the ambiguity inherent in the activity of isolated neurons is converted into a unique and meaningful assembly state. The rapid distribution of assembly information necessitates high firing rates, sustained activity, and dense local connectivity. All these conditions fit nicely with recent experimental findings. The fourth consequence – the founding of conscious awareness on local reverberatory activity – is still highly controversial – and should be viewed, at this stage, as a prediction of the local “ignition” hypothesis.
Abstract
For a neuroscientist working under the assumption of a complete correspondence between mind and brain, conscious awareness poses a profound mystery. It is a unique phenomenon in which a state of a physical system – i.e. a distributed pattern of neuronal activity is inexplicably transformed into an absolutely private and internal mental experience. Thus, the relevant point of view that needs to be taken when considering neuronal mechanisms underlying phenomenal experience must also be intrinsic – that of the brain’s neurons themselves. In contrast, the perspective taken by most neuroscience research examines neuronal activity from an external observer perspective. Here I will conjecture that the intrinsic perspective is implemented in the brain through rapid and recurrent neuronal activity – local neuronal “ignitions”. In this dynamics, the information about the state of a local neuronal assembly is distributed back to the neurons that form the assembly through recurrent activations. A conscious percept emerges when, through these neuronal reflections, the ambiguity inherent in the activity of isolated neurons is converted into a unique and meaningful assembly state. The rapid distribution of assembly information necessitates high firing rates, sustained activity, and dense local connectivity. All these conditions fit nicely with recent experimental findings. The fourth consequence – the founding of conscious awareness on local reverberatory activity – is still highly controversial – and should be viewed, at this stage, as a prediction of the local “ignition” hypothesis.
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction vii
- Time after time 1
- Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 21
- From probabilities to percepts 37
- Being in time 81
- The (lack of) mental life of some machines 95
- Restless minds, wandering brains 121
- Fuzzy consciousness 149
- Two dynamical themes in Husserl 165
- Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 185
- The brain and its states 211
- An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 231
- Index 259
Chapters in this book
- Prelim pages i
- Table of contents v
- Introduction vii
- Time after time 1
- Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness 21
- From probabilities to percepts 37
- Being in time 81
- The (lack of) mental life of some machines 95
- Restless minds, wandering brains 121
- Fuzzy consciousness 149
- Two dynamical themes in Husserl 165
- Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness 185
- The brain and its states 211
- An integrative pluralistic approach to phenomenal consciousness 231
- Index 259
