8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness

Chapters in this book

1. Prelim pages i
2. Table of contents v
3. Contributors ix
4. 1. Higher-order theories of consciousness 1
5. Part I: Defenders of higher-order theories
6. 2. Varieties of higher-order theory 17
7. 3. Higher-order thoughts, animal consciousness, and misrepresentation 45
8. 4. Higher-order global states (HOGS) 67
9. 5. The superiority of HOP to HOT 93
10. 6. HOP over FOR, HOT theory 115
11. 7. A higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness 137
12. 8. Assumptions of a subjective measure of consciousness 173
13. Part II: Critics of the higher-order approach
14. 9. What phenomenal consciousness is like 203
15. 10. Either FOR or HOR 227
16. 11. A cold look at HOT theory 255
17. 12. HOT theories of consciousness 277
18. 13. A few thoughts too many? 295
19. 14. Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheory 315
20. 15. Ouch! An essay on pain 339
21. Index of names 363
22. Index of topics 365