Volume 141, Issue 1

Metaphor theories can provide new methodological means for the analysis of Akkadian cuneiform legal documents, especially with regard to the interpretation of terms and legal concepts in Babylonian contracts. In this article we examine the metaphorical phrase of ina ḫūd libbišu (from/in the joy of his heart), which becomes a terminus technicus in the Neo-Babylonian contracts and show that it did not only supersede the traditional waiver of action clauses but also introduced a real voluntative element, by which a seller consented to the transfer of ownership.

The question of the influence of Roman law on tannaitic legal literature, composed in Roman Palestine from the first to the third centuries CE, is currently the focus of an intense scholarly debate. While some argue for a deep link between rabbinic and Roman legal discourse, others regard the impact of Roman law on the rabbis as merely superficial. The current article aims to contribute to this debate by presenting a case study that demonstrates a high level of engagement, by some rabbis, with Roman legal discourse, one that goes well beyond superficial borrowing. In this case study, a rabbinic ruling regarding the inheritance of captives is shown to depend heavily on Roman juristic discourse over the ramifications of the Lex Cornelia de captivis. In a sophisticated process of reworking, the rabbis adapt Roman legal materials and principles into a rabbinic framework. Most importantly, we show that this reworking includes the reappropriation of a native tannaitic term (‘in the medina ’) in order to translate a Roman technical legal term ( in civitate ), infusing the Hebrew term with new legal meanings. The details of this case study reveal what is normally concealed: the self-awareness of the rabbis who handle a Roman legal literary source, most probably derived from a concrete juristic discourse, deliberately reworking it to accord with rabbinic terminology, style, and form. This was probably not a one-time process, and it could well have been standard practice among some of the rabbis. Thus, this case study suggests that the evidence for a dramatic impact of Roman legal discourse on tannaitic halakha might be hiding in plain sight.

The Roman law of burial can be reconstructed not only from the legal sources, but also from the numerous funerary inscriptions that have been found in the city of Rome. Doing so requires resolving various inconsistencies between the two groups of sources. The main conflict stems from the categorisation of the tomb as a res religiosa in the legal sources, while the inscriptions seem to allow the transfer of the ius sepulchri through transactions and wills. Furthermore, the legal nature of the funerary inscriptions for qualifying a tomb and establishing burial rights needs to be clarified. Contrary to a scholarly opinion, the inscriptions themselves do not constitute the burial order. Instead, they merely reproduce parts of the underlying legal transactions that were used to establish the order of the tomb and the burial rights associated with it. Against this background, an analysis of the well-known distinction between sepulchra hereditaria and sepulchra familiaria provides for new insights into the design and the limits of the grave founder’s dispositions. In sum, the thorough comparison of the epigraphic and the legal material demonstrates the reliability of the funerary inscriptions for the legal analysis of Roman burial law.

D. 32,37,5 contains a testamentary disposition in Greek in which the testator refers to a deposit of 15.000 denarii. It was agreed that the testator (depositee) should pay the sum of money received from the depositor, together with interest, to a third party upon coming of age. The article seeks to show that the testator and the other persons involved are Romans and that the beneficiary third party received a fideicommissum. The fragment has nothing to do with a contract in favour of a third party. D. 32,37,6 is about the attempt of a Roman woman to circumvent the lack of testamenti factio of a beneficiary by renaming a testamentary donation. There is no substantive connection between § 5 and § 6. The rescript of the chancery of Diocletian in C. 3,42,8 (a. 293) cannot serve as evidence for the admission of a contract in favour of a third party. It was changed by the second Codex commission, as the reproduction of the version in the Codex Iustinianus’ 1 st ed. in the index of Thalelaios shows. The actio utilis granted to the third at the end is an addition of the second Codex commission. In its original content, the constitution, in accordance with the principles of Roman law, did not grant the third party an action arising from an agreement in his favour.

While the older scholarship modified the last sentence of our text by logical reasons, the reinforced textual conservatism of the last decades led to full confidence in the text handed down in the Florentina, so they tried to solve contradictions by interpretation. The following remarks try to confirm this confidence as unjustified. Based on thoughts on the meaning of praetextatus and materfamilias in the sense of the commented edict ‘de adtemptata pudicitia’ and its telos to punish the degredation of the victim’s honour (contumelia), the first two sentences give indeed a coherent explanation of the edict’s scope. The last one however contains based on today’s prevailing interpretations neither something new nor any conclusion, but only a summary. If we assume instead – as indicated by the Eastern Roman tradition – a partial dittography in the Florentina and apply the original acceptation of habitus as behaviour, the last sentence explains the edict only to require appropriate behaviour and not appropriate dress.

The colonate as it was established under Diocletian depended on the credit an estate owner provided to a farmer. The latter had to provide at any moment services instead of interest and consequently had to reside in or near the estate. If the credit was used for the poll tax and the credit agreement was inserted into the census of the estate, the colonate in its public law form was created. It involved also a change in the status of the colonus. The subservience to the estate owner made his status into one of a subjected status which passed on to the offspring. In the east abolition of the poll tax implied the lifting of the colonate. In the west, in provinces of the former West-Roman Empire, we see in the sixth century a colonate which is hereditary but which has to all appearances no connection with the poll tax, if that still existed. It seems that a group of law texts which only deal with the descent of coloni was interpreted as standing on their own, not connected with taxation. In this way, it is submitted, the colonate shed its fiscal component and became a category of mere personal law.

The article deals with the question of the date of the laesio enormis (C. 4,44,2.8.12. 15), according to which the seller can cancel the purchase if the purchase price does not even reach half the value of the object of purchase, but the buyer can avert this by paying the shortfall. To answer this question, a hitherto overlooked source, the index of Thalelaios to C. 4,44,15, is consulted. The index reproduces the wording of C. 4,44,15 in the Codex of the year 529. The text agrees in part with CTh. 3,1,4 and in part with C. 4,44,15 in the Codex repetitae praelectionis. The similarities with CTh. 3,1,4 show that the price limit did not exist in the Codex of the year 529. It does not go back to Diocletian, but was inserted by the second Codex commission, which orientated itself on two of Justinian’s constitutions. An appendix deals with the question of the place where Diocletian was when C. 4,44,2 was issued in November 285. Inhalt: I. Einleitung. – II. Das Gesetz des Kaisers Gratianus vom 2. Mai 383 im Codex Theodosianus (CTh. 3,1,4), S. 353. – III.C. 4,44,2. 8 und 15 im Codex repetitae praelectionis, S. 359, 1. Zur Überlieferung von C. 4,44 De rescindenda venditione, 2. C. 4,44,2 (Diocl.; a. 285), a) Zur Textkonstitution von C. 4,44,2 , b) Zum Inhalt von C. 4,44,2 , 3. C. 4,44,8 (Diocl.; a. 293), a) Zur Textkonstitution von C. 4,44,8 , b) Zum Inhalt von C. 4,44,8 ; 4. C. 4,44,12 (Diocl.; a.?); 5. C. 4,44,15 (Gratianus; a. 383). – IV. Der Index zu C. 4,44,15 (Bas. 19,10,84), S. 372, 1. Überlieferung und Text des Index zu C. 4,44,15, 2. Die Abweichungen des Index von CTh. 3,1,4 und C. 4,44,15, 3. Folgerungen. – V. Die Einfügung der Wertgrenze durch die zweite Codexkommission, S. 380. – VI. Folgerungen für C. 4,44,8.12 und 2, S. 384, 1. Zur Rekonstruktion von C. 4,44,8, 2. Zur Rekonstruktion von C. 4,44,12, 3. Zur Rekonstruktion von C. 4,44,2, a) Weitere Texteingriffe der zweiten Codexkommission? , aa. Rem maioris pretii, bb. tu vel, cc. Emptoribus/emptor, dd. humanum est, b) Das mögliche Kriterium für eine Rückabwicklung , c) Zur Rechtsgrundlage der Rückabwicklung . – VII. Anderweitige Spuren des Codex 1. Auflage in Werken aus dem justinianischen Rechtsunterricht, S. 404, 1. Der Codex Iustinianus im Rechtsunterricht, a) Die Kaiserkonstitutionen im Rechtsstudium , b) Vorlesungszeiten und Inkrafttreten der 1. und 2. Auflage des Codex , 2. Unterricht zum Codex des Jahres 529 und des Jahres 534, 3. Reste von Vorlesungen zum Codex 1. Auflage: Erklärungsmodelle, a) Aufgabe und Kompetenzen der ersten und zweiten Codexkommission , b) Verwendung veralteten Materials oder redaktionelle Fehler? , 4. Beispiele für Divergenzen der lateinischen und indirekten griechischen Überlieferung, a) C. 4,14,3 , b) C. 8,53,2 , c) C. 7,65,5 , d) C. 3,36,25 . – VIII. Ergebnisse, S. 424, Anhang: Zum Erlassort von C. 4,44,2

or (Alaric’s) Breviary, has survived, following the oldest version of the Lex Salica, in a manuscript from about 760 ad, now in Wolfenbüttel. The Epitome probably originates from mid 6 th century in northern Burgundy, and may have been drafted by an instructor of law. It stands out thanks to its practical handling of the later Roman law at that time and environment, adapting traditional regulations to contemporary demands.

Julian’s solution of a sales law case as transmitted in D. 19,1,23 has often been described as erroneous, leading to a purchaser’s double compensation ex empto. It has been suggested that the fragment is interpolated and Julian was originally talking about actio fiduciae. Avoiding both an error by Julian as well as the suspicion of interpolation, this article tries to give another explanation, reinforcing aspects that have already been emphasized within the long lasting scholarly discussion and proposing a reconstruction of a lost element of Julian’s text.

The following paper studies the much-debated term politikoi nomoi (‘civil laws’), as recorded in P.Gur. 2.44–45 = Sel.Pap. II 256 = CPJ I 19 (226 BCE, Crocodilopolis). The term is used here in the context of a diagramma, which allows the consideration in court of the politikoi nomoi – a body of law subsidiary to royal legislation, applicable whenever matter at dispute is not addressed by the latter. I argue that the term is used here for the designation of city laws of Alexandria. In P.Gur. 2, in a case heard by Greek dikasts outside Alexandria, the diagramma is introduced in order to allow one of the litigants to draw upon the Alexandrian dikê erêmos. However, it is quite plausible that in its original context of conception, the diagramma was meant to serve as guideline in Alexandrian courts of law only, not elsewhere in Egypt. Its usurpation, and ultimate admission by non-Alexandrian dikasts is indicative of the proliferation of Alexandrian laws and regulations in Ptolemaic Egypt at large.

It is sometimes assumed that Talmudic civil law was barely more than a copy of Roman law. Rabbis indeed lived in a Roman-law environment and a superficial look at Talmudic and Roman law does reveal many similarities. However, an attentive analysis of the rules on liability for animals unveils Talmudic law’s single characteristics and indeed its resistance to external influences in this context; most likely the rabbis endeavoured to preserve the independence of Talmudic law from the secular ruling authority rather than conforming with it.

After ten years of preparation, the “Handbuch des Römischen Privatrechts” was published in 2023. Two of the co-editors explain the origin, the objectives, and the structure of the work and provide information on the progress and the challenges of the project. The footnotes contain a link to corrigenda to the index of sources.

The governor of a senatorial province ( proconsul ) can delegate iurisdictional power to his legati (iurisdictio mandata). He cannot transfer ius gladii and coercitio, nor the power to release a criminal suspect from custody. The governor’s practice however, as described by the transmitted text of D. 1,16,6pr., taken from Ulpian’s De officio proconsulis, is held to be interpolated. Reexamination of the passage shows there is no need to suppose any manipulation of the text with regards to content.