Volume 55, Issue 4

Since the 1970s, a paradigm shift of industrial modernity in Europe has taken place. The post-War boom epoch until 1975 now appears as a concluded historical era. Historiography must therefore develop analytical criteria to historicise this period, to demarcate the “age of the boom” and our present phase “after the boom”. The article provides arguments in favour of the thesis that the end of the period occurred around 1975/80 and sketches an epistemological methodology, with which it can be historicised.

Next to the expression “Histoire contemporaine”, the term “Histoire du temps present” has increasingly come into use in France over the past years. As in Germany, the development of contemporary history as a separate discipline began in France after the First World War. One of its precursors was Pierre Renouvin. After the Second World War, the state restructured research by the foundation of the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, but simultaneously denied it access to the archives. Under the influence of the writings of Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre and especially Henri Michel privileged the use of interviews of contemporaries. The documentation of the liberation of the country quickly developed into one of the foci in the work of the Comité. Due to public criticism, the Comité was dissolved; the Institut d'histoire du temps présent took its place in 1978. At the same time, the period of closure for state files was reduced to thirty years. Under the founding director François Bédarida, research made a new start, but as a reaction to exposures and scandals it at first developed into an internal French debate about the nation's past. The fading of the generation of contemporary witnesses in conjunction with the embedding of contemporary history at the universities and the succession of young researchers have increasingly objectified the discussion. The IHTP, responsible for the beginning of this development, has recently entered a crisis due to the demand for a reform of state financed research. In view of the establishment of a number of new research institutions, a reorientation regarding content is indispensable for this institution, if it is to retain its leading position in France.

For over ten years the Italian parliament discussed the so-called Legge Merlin. However, it was only in 1958 that parliament abolished controlled prostitution and closed the case chiuse – state licensed brothels, which since Cavour's time had provided medical care for and control of prostitutes. Justified in the 19th century as a means to combat venereal diseases, discussions surrounding the case di tolleranza became increasingly complex after the Second World War. While human and women's rights grew in importance, the discovery of penicillin weakened health policy arguments and justifications. At the same time, international pressure increased, as even the United Nations took action against licensed prostitution in member states. Finally, the debate reflects the changing definitions of the role of women as well as the break with a number of social patterns.

The abduction of the leading politician Peter Lorenz in February 1975 was one of the greatest challenges as yet for the “Internal Security” of the Federal Republic of Germany; today, however, it is largely out-shadowed by the events of the “German Autumn” of 1977. The kidnapping of politicians as a means of terrorism was unprecedented. There were no prepared strategies for the crisis management groups in the Federal and State governments; after almost a week, they decided to give in and have five imprisoned terrorists flown out to socialist South Yemen. The files, policy and debriefing papers of the crisis management groups and the involved ministries reveal the divides, the ideas for solutions and the debates leading up to this decision. Contrary to public perception, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt only played a minor role in the decision making process. The State governments especially, dominated by Helmut Kohl and Klaus Schütz, pushed through their concessionary attitude. It also becomes clear that the new, media-orientated strategy of the terrorists as well as the overstrained and internally shaken Berlin State police sharply limited the governmental scope of action. The “successful” abduction of Lorenz set standards for terrorist as well as governmental actions, as the terrorist occupation of the Stockholm embassy showed soon after.

“In the Summer of sixty-one, on the 13th of August, we closed the border and nobody saw us”, was the rhyme in an East German propaganda song after the construction of the Berlin Wall. But did the western intelligence services really have no clues as to the Eastern preparations for the closure of the border? Documents now accessible in the Federal Archives in Koblenz do not confirm this assessment. As early as the end of July, 1961, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) indicated to the Federal Government in one of its routine monthly reports that the possibility of an “effective blockade” of West Berlin by the GDR had to be considered. While politicians in West Berlin and Bonn deemed diverse reactions by the East as possible, in the view of the Bundesnachrichtendienst, more signs were pointing to the forceful barring of the sector boundary than towards any other course of action during the weeks and days before and during the construction of the Berlin Wall. This is precisely what the BND assessment reported to the political leadership of the Federal Republic.