Volume 84, Issue 1

The Imperial Navy’s cruiser squadron, which was permanently deployed in East Asia, was constantly present in the region during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which was mainly fought in Korea on the outskirts of the German possessions in Kiautschou with the port of Tsingtau. Although the German Empire remained neutral in the conflict, warships were nevertheless deployed to gather intelligence and naval interventions were necessary to guarantee German neutrality. The role of the German navy is analysed on the basis of archival sources. At the beginning of the war, the cruiser squadron was able to contribute important intelligence gathering and later ensured the preservation of German neutrality on several occasions, shielded the harbour of Tsingtau as a neutral area, acted as a deterrent factor and guaranteed dealings with both warring parties in accordance with international law, thus preventing an escalation and avoiding the involvement of the German Empire in the Russo-Japanese War.

This article deals with the establishment and activities of the Wehrmacht Academy in the years 1935–38, during which selected general staff officers were trained in strategic thinking in courses lasting a year. After completing the course, the officers were intended for employment in a joint general staff, which is why the existence of the academy should be considered as part of the debate on the creation of the higher command structure of the German armed forces. After reflecting on the topic in the context of Prussian-German general staff training, and the »scientification« of war in the Weimar Republic, the connection to Nazi ideology and the transfer of knowledge that some course participants generated when drawing up regulations, or postwar studies for the Historical Division, and in military journalism, are discussed. The article concludes with an explanation of the background to the closure of the Wehrmacht Academy in 1938.

By December 1886 a number of sensational spy scandals had starkly revealed serious weaknesses in the German Empire’s intelligence capabilities. As a result, Bismarck’s head of military counter-intelligence, Hermann Krüger, attempted to deal with the emerging crisis by advocating a major paradigm shift in Germany’s approach to battling increasingly successful French military espionage. He made this proposal in a lengthy secret memorandum to the chancellor that analyzed the problem and recommended far-reaching changes to deal with it. In his rejection of these proposals, Bismarck provided a rationale that offers important new insights into his approach to espionage and counter-espionage during his chancellorship. Both documents are key new sources that significantly advance our understanding of the conduct and evolution of military intelligence operations in the period 1871–1890.

This essay assesses the current landscape of Cold War historiography, suggesting the time is ripe for a fresh approach focussing on a »Military Turn«. The discussion appraises the opportunities and challenges such an approach entails, and argues that, should it be successfully embraced, it promises rewards not simply for understanding the Cold War, but also for the future of military history.

Against the background of the »Zeitenwende« (»turning point«), the essay discusses the question of the necessity for employing a »military turn« in historical research on the Cold War. Based on reflections on the military in the Cold War, it argues in favour of an integrating and integrated military history that is open to new perspectives in historiography and contributes its perspectives to the field of general history.

This essay argues for a reconsideration of German security and defense policy in the 1980 s by drawing attention to the US-German Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement of 1982. This is no longer interpreted in a Eurocentric way as a reinforcement of the European war zone, but as an instrument of a US global strategy that had been developing since the late 1970 s.