A Cold War »Military Turn«: Opportunities and Challenges

Opportunities: the landscape of Cold War scholarship

Whilst for students of the Cold War the journey of its historiography from its outset in the 1940 s to the present day is a well-travelled path, it is nevertheless worth revisiting briefly for the purposes of our current discussion. Crucial to understanding the genesis of Cold War scholarship is to appreciate that at its core lies a triangular paradigm of interconnectivity – a mutually dependent relationship between the progress of the two academic disciplines, International Relations and International History, and the influence on each of these of having developed against the backdrop of the evolving context of the Cold War itself. Certainly, at least until the end of the Cold War, the relationship between International Relations and International History was characterised by a significant element of tension. International Relations was a relatively young discipline, originating in the aftermath of the First World War and perhaps understandably, in order to survive, university International Relations departments sought to assert themselves as different from and separate to History departments. The rivalry, however, went deeper as at a fundamental level International Relations sought to underline its distinctiveness from History. As Fred Halliday explains, »In its initial phase, [International Relations] sought to distinguish itself from those disciplines out of which it had emerged: thus, it was distinct from international, that is, diplomatic, history in its comparative and theoretical approach.«^[2] The resulting tension produced an enduring vibrancy in both historical and theoretical approaches.^[3] By the 1980 s, however, Cold War scholarship had reached something of an impasse. By this stage debates had navigated from initial »orthodox« accounts through the »revisionist« school to »post-revisionism.« There were a number of different strands to post-revisionism, but an important contribution was John Lewis Gaddis’s »long peace« interpretation, which embraced Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theories and argued that the Cold War bipolar system was a source of stability in the international system.^[4] Other significant post-revisionist approaches included Geir Lundestadt’s »empire by invitation« thesis, Michael Hogan’s »corporatist« approach and Anders Stephanson’s discussion of multipolarity.^[5] Yet none of the dominant narratives anticipated rapid change in the international system, and International Relations theorists were largely taken by surprise when the Cold War ended in the way that it did. Indeed, the failure of contemporary International Relations theories to anticipate the rapid yet relatively peaceful conclusion of the Cold War was a profound and uncomfortable jolt for the discipline, a jolt that prompted a period of reflective readjustment. No longer could theoreticians downplay the importance of empirical evidence; a more holistic, cooperative approach was needed.^[6]

The end of the Cold War thus injected fresh energy into scholarship. Suddenly scholars knew the finale of the contest and, enthused by the exciting prospect of fresh archival resources, naturally explored new perspectives of both structure and process in their research. Moreover, the prevailing mood, at least in the West, was one buoyed by positivity and confidence. The dark, dangerous days of division and schism had ended and the clouds of suspicion and distrust parted. The future would be bright, cooperative, prosperous. Francis Fukuyama famously pronounced the »end of history«.^[7] What followed was something of a revolution as academics scrambled to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of neorealism. Scholars who had already begun questioning the role of the state now rose to prominence and constructivist approaches with their emphasis on the ideas and beliefs which inform actors on the international scene gained significant bandwidth. Perhaps the most direct refutation of neorealism was postmodernism, which became particularly influential in the 1990 s and 2000 s. Repudiating the intellectual prison of neorealism, postmodernism rejected absolutes, viewing knowledge and understanding as a discourse, distilled through a subjective prism.^[8]

These developments have shifted academic approaches to our understanding of the international system, with power no longer viewed as a function of the state or the international system but rather understood in terms of people’s lived experiences and identities. In Cold War scholarship there has been a blossoming of enquiry into issues such as culture, gender and society. Scholars have sought to adopt a more cooperative, interdisciplinary approach including anthropology, area studies and economics and have sought to position the Cold War alongside wider twentieth century themes, such as decolonisation, globalisation and the progress of modernity. This generation of Cold War debate is often labelled the »Global« or »Cultural« turn, though the two are not entirely synonymous.

Whilst there had long been emphasis on »global« themes in Cold War scholarship, the publication of Odd Arne Westad’s »The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times« in 2005 marked a significant paradigm shift. Westad’s focus on the Third World heralded a fundamental shift in emphasis from the centre to the periphery. Much subsequent debate centred on the complexity of the North/South dynamic and the need to establish a nuanced, multifaceted picture of the Cold War’s impact on the Third World.^[9] This emphasis on more »global« understandings of the Cold War has intersected with a renewed emphasis on ideology and the role of ideas in Cold War accounts. The Global Turn interacts with wider ideational and cultural debates, with the Cold War viewed as a fight for the »soul of mankind« between competing versions of progress and modernity.^[10] As such its battlegrounds transcended traditional forms of warfare and encompassed the innermost essence of hearts and minds – ideas, beliefs, cultures, even language itself.

Although such avenues of enquiry have, and will continue, to provide much fertile, vibrant research, there are signs that we are once more reaching a crossroads in Cold War historiography.^[11] There have for some time been hints of disquiet at the overall direction of travel of the »Global« and »Cultural« turn approaches. There is clearly a paradox at the heart of today’s Cold War scholarship – of reducing the contest’s significance to simply one strand in wider twentieth century history while simultaneously magnifying its importance by identifying it as omnipresent – in gender, popular culture, aid, science and technology, the environment, and so on. As Lawrence Freedman noted in 2010 when critiquing the Cambridge History of the Cold War, its contributors were failing to »untangle the Cold War from all the other strands of twentieth century history, work out what was distinctive and special about it«.^[12] Some current scholars are already distancing themselves from more holistic and ideational frameworks, and this suggests that a new paradigm shift in Cold War debate may be germinating. For example, in his 2020 book, »Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe«, Lorenz Lüthi maintains a global perspective but does so by seeing the Cold War as three distinct but intersecting regional conflicts; while Sergey Radchenko’s 2024 work »To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power« positions Moscow firmly back in the centre of the Cold War.^[13]

Opportunities: the current atmosphere in International Affairs

As discussed, the evolution of Cold War historiography has not only been influenced by dynamic relationships between different academic disciplines, notably between those with a theoretical stance and those emphasising empiricism, but has also been shaped by the background of its real-time context: the academic conflicts between Cold War scholars were played out against the setting of the developing Cold War and in a sense academia must be interpreted as a facet of the Cold War itself. This synergy has endured: the optimism and hope of the early 1990 s provided the ambience in which scholars turned their attention to cooperation; the progress of globalisation was the environment for research on the transnational; emphasis on ideas and constructs created a focus on cultures and identities. For Cold War history, therefore, the Global and Cultural turns which have dominated academia in the new millennium were not only the logical next step in Cold War scholarship but were also in tune with the prevailing contemporary milieu.

Today we look back on those halcyon days of 1990 s optimism with a mixture of nostalgia and regret. We have now witnessed the passing of the hegemonic postCold War international order founded on the unipolar US moment and the global ascendancy of a neoliberal capitalist economic system. The 9/11 terrorist attacks not only destroyed the visible embodiment of Western capitalism’s strength but pierced its aura of confidence and positivity. In the aftermath, the war on terror and associated conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan compounded the world’s problems, while the impact of the 2008/9 financial crisis exposed the false promises of neoliberalism, replacing them with an international mood of pessimism and cynicism. Today we face a multiplicity of threats, many of which, such as the challenges of climate change, require a global collaborative response; but instead of cooperation, the international community is riven with division. In these circumstances, geopolitical blocs, traditional power politics and protectionism are flourishing and there is fertile breeding ground for the mendacities of populism, the politics of division and the menace of far-right extremism – all of which have the potential to threaten the very foundations of seemingly mature democracies. Meanwhile tensions are exploding in traditional regional hotspots, notably the Middle East.

Against this backdrop, the war in Ukraine provides yet more cause for despair. The new reality of »the West« grappling with a threatening, hostile Russia naturally resonates with the darkest days of the traditional Cold War. Once again America and Western Europe are struggling to maintain the strength and coherence of their alliance and sustain assurance for a long-term and steadfast economic commitment. Once again both sides must navigate the plethora of risks of escalation, juggling dangers of miscalculation and brinkmanship. The world is dividing – NATO has strengthened, though its internal tensions are highlighted, while China, Russia and Iran provide an alternative grouping for those countries suspicious of Western (especially American) »leadership« and the BRICS organisation presents a potential rival to the G7. For many countries, a non-aligned middle path seems the most advantageous, but this too is a difficult route fraught with complexity. Meanwhile, in the background lies a perhaps greater fear – the potentially more serious shadow of a deeper Cold War threatening between the US and China. For those conversant with Kennan’s original theories, the »containment« of Russia with »patience and firmness« certainly resonates.^[14] Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has also plunged the European continent into a »hot war« of the type not seen since the World Wars. Historians of World War I strategy, with their knowledge of entrenched battle lines and the grinding detail of attrition warfare, find their expertise frighteningly relevant. As I write, defence analysts debate the wisdom of Zelenskyy’s surprise advance into Kursk and debate its impact on Russia’s campaign for Pokrovsk. At the same time, Middle East military strategists discuss the efficacy of Israel’s »Iron Dome« missile defence shield and probe the possibility of retaliatory strikes on Tehran’s nuclear programme. Traditional »war studies« has never seemed more relevant.

We have evidently reached a moment when there is both an opportunity and a requirement to reset the Cold War debate. In historiographical terms the Global and Cultural Turn approaches are becoming tired; there are signs of criticisms emerging and there is clearly more appetite for a discourse which sharpens our focus and recaptures the Cold War’s competitive core. This coincides with a darkening of the prevailing ambience shaping our current affairs consciousness. With contemporary global affairs discussions centring on issues of power, security and military might, it is natural to anticipate academic approaches to the Cold War to resonate with these trends and to emphasise geopolitics, focussing on competition rather than cooperation and the realities of power rather than ideas or abstracts. Ostensibly, this seems a promising opportunity for military historians as from the perspectives of Cold War scholars, the shift in current affairs paradigms affords an opportunity for new approaches. In essence, the time for a new wave of Cold War scholarship is ripe, and the opportunities this presents to military historians are plentiful. Obvious lines of enquiry are to ask whether the Cold War ended at all or are we now merely in a second stage of the earlier conflict? Following on from this, what mistakes were made by the previous generation and what opportunities were missed in the 1990 s in the quest for a more peaceful and harmonious world? Or are we facing an entirely different contest, a new Cold War?^[15] Conversely, should we be thinking about a »Cold War« today at all? Is this old mindset more of a hindrance than a help in assessing today’s international affairs? Fascinating though they are, these questions largely lie beyond the scope of this paper’s discussion as my question here is to ask whether this shift in our analytical paradigm affords, even necessitates, a re-evaluation of the traditional Cold War period, usually defined as from roughly 1945–1991.

Given the current circumstances of land warfare taking place at the backdoor of Western Europe, it is to be expected that historians will look back at the Cold War years with a sharp eye to the importance of military affairs and to those elements and themes which retain significant importance today. And yet, as a discipline, it is essential that we embrace this opportunity for a Military Turn in Cold War historiography with great care – both in order to make a positive and enduring contribution to Cold War scholarship, and also to maximise its potential as a vehicle to further the progress of the discipline of military history itself, a discipline which has too often in recent years been marginalised and disregarded as excessively specialised or old fashioned. The Military Turn must not lead us backwards to a narrow, restrictive mindset but rather should be utilised as a lens – one which can refocus Cold War studies on the competitive, antagonistic essence of the Cold War’s heart whilst also illuminating its wider, more intangible and abstract aspects. One must also remain cognisant of the original challenges which military historians faced when grappling with a field of such scope and scale as the Cold War. Certainly, academic focus shifted away from the military dimension because of wider theoretical paradigm shifts, notably the impact of globalisation and concentration on cooperation rather than competition; however, another contributing factor was frustration with the inadequacies of a military paradigm. Rather than clarifying our understanding of the Cold War, military approaches tended to become fragmented and disparate. Instead of synthesising, they often divided, splitting the Cold War into ever more complex and varied elements. Of course, this is the challenge that lies at the heart of all Cold War scholarship – that the subject is simply too vast in scope to ever synthesise into one narrative. And yet, unless military historians keep sight of the bigger picture and overall Cold War framework they risk becoming so specialised that they lack enduring relevance.

The task ahead for military historians is certainly not an easy one. It is, of course, not possible to produce one »military history« of the Cold War, or even one stage of it. However, that is not to say that when researching discrete topics, scholars should not strive to contribute to the wider picture of Cold War understanding. There is undoubtedly an opportunity to move Cold War debates forward to a new stage, and space within the next generation of debate for military history paradigms. For the remainder of this article, I will lay out the challenges, both practical and conceptual, which military historians must seek to overcome if we are to fully and positively embrace this opportunity.

Challenges: practical

The first set of challenges we encounter are practical. The disparate aspects of the Cold War’s military spheres have long caused problems of scale for Cold War historians. Not only is the time frame, spanning over half a century, titanic, but the diverse facets of the Cold War’s military persona are many and these pose the analytical challenge of being distinct from each other, yet at the same time inextricably interconnected. The military dimension of the Cold War encompasses both the nuclear and conventional spheres as well as intelligence, espionage and covert operations, developments in science and technology, and the impact of military industrial complexes on economies and societies. Each of these areas is uniquely challenging, and the interaction between them infinitely complex.

The nuclear dimension is vital to the Cold War’s character – contributing to its extreme danger and destructive potential whilst simultaneously keeping the contest »cold« and even providing the superpowers at times with a shared experience of responsibility and caution. Yet while the nuclear dimension is vital to the Cold War’s identity, this aspect does not situate neatly with many theoretical approaches to the Cold War. For example, although John Lewis Gaddis emphasised the stabilising effect of nuclear weapons in »The Long Peace«, neorealist purists, notably Kenneth Waltz, saw systemic factors in the international system as central to stability in the Cold War international structure rather than nuclear weapons.^[16] Likewise, Marxist accounts centred on ideological aspects and downplayed the significance of nuclear weapons, while neomarxist interpretations focus on the inherently exploitative nature of the economic system.^[17] More recently, the focus on global and transnational approaches to the Cold War have not prioritised the nuclear dimension as an aspect of traditional military history, concentrating instead on crossborder aspects of the subject such as its impact on innovation in science, research and technology, or the transnational links between anti-nuclear peace movements. Significantly, this avenue has intersected with the Cultural Turn, contributing to a more holistic approach to the Cold War and its role in people’s lives and experiences. For defence specialists interested in the more »traditional« evolution of nuclear strategy, Lawrence Freedman and Jeffrey Michaels’ magisterial study, now in its fourth edition, remains unsurpassed. Yet while this work remains essential reading for all Cold War historians, it does not focus specifically on integrating an overall understanding of the nuclear dimension into Cold War scholarly paradigms.^[18]

Aspects of conventional military competition in the Cold War have proven equally, if not more, challenging for Cold War specialists. Understandably, scholarship on conventional weapons and warfare has tended to focus on specific conflicts (with Korea and Vietnam typically receiving considerable attention), rather than attempting a synthesising approach to the conventional aspect of the Cold War as a whole.^[19] Literature on how military institutions dealt with the changing Cold War context has also tended to concentrate largely on the US. Yet, like nuclear, conventional warfare was an intrinsic element of the Cold War. Not only did it remain an important strand underpinning the various nuclear debates, it was also a key component in both the development of and competition in science and technology.^[20] It also represented a vital element of superpower capability and competition in the Third World, precipitating more asymmetric forms of warfare. Indeed, this has been an especially vibrant area of research in recent years as scholars have sought to overcome archival and language barriers and present more balanced and nuanced accounts of the Cold War’s impact and interaction with the Global South.^[21] There are already signs emerging in the historiography that scholars are striving to overcome the challenges presented by the scope of the Cold War’s conventional military aspects. Paul Chamberlin’s »The Cold War’s Killing Fields« is a key example of a valuable contribution in this respect. He positions the »hot« wars in Indochina alongside those in Asia and the Middle East, arguing that the vast swathe of territory stretching from the Middle East to South Asia formed a post-colonial borderland that became a vital Cold War theatre. It was the Cold War, he argues, which was responsible for these conflicts becoming as bloody and violent as they did, as it was the Cold War which resulted in superpower equipment, capability and expertise being placed on the same battlefields as guerrilla fighters and post-colonial armies.^[22]

Chamberlin’s paradigm-shifting book is an example of the research opportunities military historians must explore if they are to exploit the potential of a Military Turn in the next generation of Cold War discourse. Yet for scholars to truly embrace the wider ramifications of a Military Turn, they must not only appreciate the conventional military’s global reach but also its interaction with the nuclear dimension, its economic facets and also its links to developments in science and technology and its relevance for military innovation studies. These are areas which impacted on wider society in both the West and in the Soviet bloc, as while the Cold War resulted in science being located at a national level, the result of vital areas of scientific research driven by the Cold War was the revolution in information technology which fuelled globalisation. Finally, military historians must also be mindful of the role of espionage, surveillance and covert operations – all key arenas of Cold War competition, and ones which provide the Cold War with its distinctive tone and character.

In sum, the practical challenges which scholars face when approaching aspects of the Cold War are manifold. Whilst the subject is a vast ecosystem of intermeshing threads and interlinked aspects, research topics must be focussed and manageable. Military historians must avoid the opposing perils of on the one hand becoming too narrow or cautious in their remit and on the other of being too ambitious or broad. Yet if this tightrope can be successfully traversed, then the opportunities afforded are considerable and the Military Turn offers a vital lynchpin which links Cold War approaches to wider scholarly themes.

Challenges: conceptual

These practical challenges lead us directly to still greater challenges – conceptual challenges. The direction of Cold War scholarship over the last twenty or so years, with its emphasis on the Global Turn and more cultural and ideational themes, has resulted in a widening of the Cold War lens. The Cold War is now approached, in Federico Romero’s words, as a »kaleidoscopic multiplication of prospects, contextualisations, methodological approaches, and meanings«.^[23] In consequence, however, we now face a fundamental conundrum: we really have no generally agreed definition of what the Cold War actually was. Indeed, the term has become so fluid that it is currently in danger of losing any relevance. In »The Oxford Handbook of the Cold War,« Richard Immerman and Petra Goedde view the Cold War essentially as a historical period: »The cold war was a distinct period in 20th-century history that cannot be wished away, although some have tried. Yet albeit distinct, the cold war must be understood and evaluated within the broader context and contours of global political, economic, social and cultural developments, some of which preceded the cold war and some of which persist to the present day and doubtless will continue into the future.«^[24] Holger Nehring argues that current global readings of the Cold War are at risk of making the notion meaningless if they lose sight of its core antagonistic nature, its »war-like character«; and warns of the danger of losing any definition of the subject.^[25] Other historians have gone so far as to question whether the Cold War existed at all. Masuda Hajimu argues that it should be approached as a »constructed nature of a conflict that became ›reality‹, as opposed to something that existed as an objective situation.« The Cold War, he explains »existed not because it was there but because people thought that it existed«.^[26] Holger Nehring describes it as being »a bit like the Cheshire Cat from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland. Everyone has seen it, but it is not really there«.^[27]

The opportunity for a new Military Turn in Cold War scholarship affords us the opportunity to sharpen the focus of this debate on the definition of the Cold War. It is natural for military historians, with their emphasis on armed conflict, strategy, tactics, competition in armaments, logistics and so on, to underscore the competitive, hostile facts of »cold war«. Given how intangible, even ephemeral approaches to the Cold War have become, there is undoubtedly a place for this. And yet the challenge for military historians must be to avoid any return to an overly narrow or traditional approach. The Military Turn must not become a separate, distinct strand amongst new Cold War voices as to do so risks it being viewed as rigid and excessively specialised and as result becoming marginalised. Rather, a successful Military Turn must show an awareness of the complex landscape traversed by Cold War scholarship – the debates on ideology, culture, identity, globalisation and the transnational. It must position military perspectives confidently at the centre of Cold War understanding, but rather than excluding ideational perspectives, it must embrace these conceptual challenges and act as a lens to illuminate disparate perspectives and draw together complex threads.

Conclusion

Given the current impasse in Cold War scholarship and the present climate in international affairs an opportunity undoubtedly exists for a Military Turn to inform the next generation of Cold War scholarship. Certainly the deep-rooted practical challenges which have long confronted military historians when approaching a subject as varied and broad as the Cold War remain. How can a Military Turn be more than the sum of its individual parts? Will it not become submerged in numerous separate histories, accounts of individual conflicts, incidents, militaries, strategies and so on? How, for example, can we look comprehensively at both sides in the arms race? How can we assess scrupulously a Cold War which incorporated »hot« conventional wars in Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan with the »cold« competition of the nuclear arms race and the evolution of deterrence strategy? Yet these practical obstacles are perhaps dwarfed by the conceptual ones of defining »Cold War« and historicising it alongside enduring twentieth century themes.

The Military Turn affords the opportunity, but also the challenge, of requiring us to sharpen the focus of Cold War scholarship, restoring the competitive core to our paradigm of Cold War understanding and definition. But to do this successfully requires us to look critically at our very identity as »military historians« and to consciously and positively embrace an ever more interdisciplinary, accommodating and synthesising approach to our academic field and identity. If we succeed, the rewards, not simply for our understanding of the Cold War, but for the future relevance and vibrancy of military history as an academic discipline, will be great. To be successful, the Military Turn must be approached as an analytical lens which can illuminate and integrate wider approaches and move forward from the Global and Cultural turns. It should not be a path backwards to the past, but a beacon for a more inclusive, cooperative and relevant academic future.