Volume 3, Issue 4

Events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 2004 terrorist attack on the school in Beslan, Russia demonstrate that terrorists are willing and able to attack large numbers of children. Moreover, pediatric casualties are likely when terrorist incidents occur in urban areas even if children are not the primary target. Very little research has been conducted on the management and outcomes of children during and after disasters. This paper discusses the known risks that terrorism brings to children, vulnerabilities in this population, basic principles of pediatric disaster response and current gaps in response capabilities.

Since the early 1980s, suicide bombings have become the deadliest form of terrorism. Suicide bombers are not generally clinically deranged and are socially and politically motivated. Furthermore, the motives of suicide bombers can be considered separately from those of their sponsoring organizations. Security personnel are advised to watch for seven signs of terrorist activity and to be mindful of certain behavioral indicators of subjects about to attack. Terrorism must be prevented at the source, during pre-attack phases, and at the target.

The role of information assurance (IA) is critical for cyber-based technologies and products, and the risk of cyberterrorism to IA is omnipresent. In particular, to achieve IA, young and dynamic developing technologies and products should be using a defined lifecycle that leverages and builds (throughout the developmental lifecycle) on a rich and proven body of knowledge and practices in risk assessment and management. The lifecycle of software development must include the following (not necessarily sequentially): the needs and requirements; specifications; contractor selection; conceptual design; systems integration, demonstration, and validation; engineering manufacturing, development, and production; and maintenance and major upgrade. In addition to addressing the functionality of the lifecycle development, from the risk analysis perspective it is just as important to focus on (1) the people's perspectives—namely, the individual, the team, the management, and the stakeholder, (2) the hardware-software perspectives, especially the risks associated with the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products and (3) the environment within which the entire system operates. This paper follows and builds on two papers previously published in this journal on the risks of terrorism associated with supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and other cyberdependent systems. Its thesis is that the reliability and integrity of such systems, and thus, the corresponding interdependent infrastructures served by them, are contingent on the following three principles of IA and cybersecurity. Adhering to these principles can be instrumental in achieving the desired level of IA and cybersecurity:(1) Risk of software intrusion must be assessed and managed throughout the lifecycle of software development, focusing on both the functionality of software development and on the people involved in the process, knowing that hackers will exploit every weakness in the system.(2) Achieving information assurance and cybersecurity must be placed high on the priority list of top management. (The two are intricately dependent on software quality and telecommunications fidelity). This is synonymous with performing a holistic risk assessment and management.(3) Risk management of cyberterrorism must be the domain priority of the entire development team and the organization's management. It must be achieved from the perspectives of the total system throughout the software and system development's lifecycles.Building on the multifarious sources of risk envisioned during the lifecycle of software development through Hierarchical Holographic Modeling, resilience in cybersecurity through risk management is discussed. The human role in IA and cybersecurity and the centrality of the educational dimension in risk management are also introduced.

Structural health monitoring (SHM) is a promising technology for determining the condition of significant transportation structures objectively for efficient management and preservation of transportation assets. In addition to identifying, locating, and quantifying damage and deterioration due to effects of operation, aging, and natural hazards, the need for taking terrorism-related hazards into account has become evident after 9/11 terrorist attacks. Key transportation facilities like major bridges were identified by Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as possible terrorist targets since their loss or even temporary deficiency could lead to major impacts on economy and mobility. Several governmental, local, and private organizations have been working on identifying possible modes of threats, determining and sorting vulnerable structures, and establishing ways to prevent, detect and respond to such attacks. Authorities are also investigating ways to integrate current and future bridge management systems with security surveillance systems. Highway bridges are key links of the transportation system. This paper reviews security measures for bridges and discuss possible integration of structural health and security monitoring for improving security and safety of bridges and emergency management after a natural or man-made disaster.

The rise of the American homeland security endeavor has created demands for knowledgeable professionals to address issues of critical infrastructure assurance. James Madison University has recently developed a survey course on infrastructure performance using a complex systems approach. Course development was facilitated by the enthusiastic support and participation of a multi-disciplinary faculty team. The course is designed for a broad student audience including physical science, public administration, health, business, economics and sociology majors. The course has been successful in terms of graduate and undergraduate student enrollment and has generated positive student feedback.Drawing on recent work from the physical, engineering, and social sciences, we take an interdisciplinary approach to understanding complex system operation and failure. We begin by considering historical examples of major system failures. We then explore the components, operation, and complex interdependencies of the infrastructures most critical to society. We divide critical infrastructures into three classes – commodity, service, and information – and focus on the electric power, health services and telecommunication sectors as representative examples.Students are exposed to literatures that inform their understanding of large, complex, and risky technical systems. Course material illustrates how complex systems engender unexpected interactions of failures to occur that can result in a cascade of increasingly serious disturbances often culminating in disaster. A major component of the course is devoted to defining and measuring risk. The final instruction block is devoted to risk management strategies involving both technology and public policy. The course concludes with the presentation of student projects that may address a historical complex system failure case study, an assessment of an existing infrastructure system, or survey a specific topic on complex system operation and failure.

More than sixty years have passed since Franklin Roosevelt forecast a victory over tyranny that could only be won with the unprecedented voluntary efforts of industry. Today the mobilization of the private sector under the banner of national defense is no longer guided by the rhetoric of mass production, but rather the emergence in the past five years of terrorism-related planning as a corporate governance issue. Whether it is possible to secure adequate private sector investment in best-practice continuity and resiliency strategies depends on the will of government to use the stick of regulation sparingly and the carrot of statutory incentives liberally.

This technical note informs the readership about the start of an interesting series of field experiments in the European Union dealing with the territorial and social impact of surveillance camera networks. A project schedule is provided along with points of contact for further collaboration.

Comments regarding the article "A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command System and NIMS" in Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 3: No. 3, Article 1. Available at: http://www.bepress.com/cgi/siteview.cgi/jhsem/vol3/iss3/1.

Review of Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach by Jeffrey Ian Ross.

Review of 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security, by R. William Johnstone.

Counterterrorism (e.g., military forces) and antiterrorism (e.g., theological dialogues) programs are the most common strategies in the prevention and potential elimination of terrorism. Professor Fathali M. Moghaddam's From the Terrorists' Point of View represents a shift in current thinking because it competes with the today's counterterrorism-antiterrorism paradigm. The core message the author sends to the national and international intelligence community is this: If you all want to end terrorism, you all should first ``see the world from the terrorists' point of view." In the terrorists' world, their terrorist acts are morally justified and rational; and although they engage in terrorism, they also deeply care for the welfare of Islamic communities. From the Terrorists' Point of View also suggests an alternative explanation for the origin of terrorism across all cultures that is based on the author's ``staircase to terrorism" metaphor. Using this metaphor, an individual moves from the ground floor to subsequent floors until he/she realizes at the top floor (fifth) of the staircase the only option is terrorism to end the injustices of the social system that individual has experienced for many years. This review suggests that, although political and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists might share the same feeling of injustices on the ground floor and on subsequent floors, this metaphor appears to be more applicable to the development of political terrorism, relative to the origin of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. It also suggests that the cultural identity crisis in Islamic communities (also discussed by the author) appears to be a more convincing approach to explain the development of this form of terrorism. The controversial nature of the author's thesis is what will make From the Terrorists' Point of View an interesting book.

Review of Shelter from the Storm: Repairing the National Emergency Management System after Hurricane Katrina, in THE ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; March 2006. Volume 604.

Some citations for recent relevant research published elsewhere. Selected by the Managing Editor of JHSEM.