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The nature of semantics: On Jackendoff’s arguments

  • Steven Gross
Published/Copyright: December 6, 2005
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The Linguistic Review
From the journal Volume 22 Issue 2-4

Abstract

Jackendoff defends a mentalist approach to semantics that investigates conceptual structures in the mind/brain and their interfaces with other structures, including specifically linguistic structures responsible for syntactic and phonological competence. He contrasts this approach with one that seeks to characterize the intentional relations between expressions and objects in the world. The latter, he argues, cannot be reconciled with mentalism. He objects in particular that intentionality cannot be naturalized and that the relevant notion of object is suspect. I critically discuss these objections, arguing in part that Jackendoff’s position rests on questionable philosophical assumptions.

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Published Online: 2005-12-06
Published in Print: 2005-12-12

Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG

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