Abstract
In his Treatise Hume makes a profound suggestion: philosophical problems, especially problems in metaphysics, are verbal. This view is most vigorously articulated and defended in the course of his investigation of the problem of the self, in the section “Of personal identity.” My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s arguments for this influential thesis and an analysis of the context that informs this 1739 version of the nature of philosophical problems that anticipates the linguistic turn in philosophy.
References
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Language and Hume’s Search for a Theory of the Self
- A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology
- Referential Indeterminacy with an Ontic Source? – A Criticism of Williams’s Defense of Vague Objects
- Worlds, Not Worldviews: Reply to Beillard
- Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles
- Kim on Events
- Curiosity Kills the Categories: A Dilemma about Categories and Modality
- Power Individuation: A New Version of the Single-Tracking View
- Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Language and Hume’s Search for a Theory of the Self
- A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology
- Referential Indeterminacy with an Ontic Source? – A Criticism of Williams’s Defense of Vague Objects
- Worlds, Not Worldviews: Reply to Beillard
- Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles
- Kim on Events
- Curiosity Kills the Categories: A Dilemma about Categories and Modality
- Power Individuation: A New Version of the Single-Tracking View
- Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory