Abstract
According to Kim, events are constituted by objects exemplifying property(ies) at a time. In this paper I wish to defend Kim’s theory of events from one source of criticism, extending it by taking into account a number of ideas developed by Davidson. In particular, I shall try to avoid events proliferation – one of the most serious problems in Kim’s theory – by using a suggestion Kim himself advances, that is, by taking adverbs and the like to be events’ rather than properties’ modifiers.
Acknowledgements
For comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper I wish to thank Donatella Donati, Andrea Iacona, Jonathan Lowe, Anna M. Thornton, Francesco-Alessio Ursini and Achille Varzi.
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©2015 by De Gruyter
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Language and Hume’s Search for a Theory of the Self
- A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology
- Referential Indeterminacy with an Ontic Source? – A Criticism of Williams’s Defense of Vague Objects
- Worlds, Not Worldviews: Reply to Beillard
- Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles
- Kim on Events
- Curiosity Kills the Categories: A Dilemma about Categories and Modality
- Power Individuation: A New Version of the Single-Tracking View
- Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Language and Hume’s Search for a Theory of the Self
- A Cardinal Worry for Permissive Metaontology
- Referential Indeterminacy with an Ontic Source? – A Criticism of Williams’s Defense of Vague Objects
- Worlds, Not Worldviews: Reply to Beillard
- Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments against Identity of Indiscernibles
- Kim on Events
- Curiosity Kills the Categories: A Dilemma about Categories and Modality
- Power Individuation: A New Version of the Single-Tracking View
- Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory