„die vernünftige Natur existirt als Zweck an sich selbst.“: Überlegungen zu Oliver Sensens Interpretation der Menschheitsformel in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten

Heiner F. Klemme

doi:10.1515/kant-2015-0007

Article

„die vernünftige Natur existirt als Zweck an sich selbst.“

Überlegungen zu Oliver Sensens Interpretation der Menschheitsformel in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten

Heiner F. Klemme

Published/Copyright: March 20, 2015

Published by

Become an author with De Gruyter Brill

Author Information Explore this Subject

From the journal Kant-Studien Volume 106 Issue 1

Abstract:

I argue that ‘end in itself’, as Kant uses it in the Groundwork, is foremost a normative concept, and not mainly a descriptive one, as Oliver Sensen claims in his book Kant on human dignity. Sensen is right in arguing that dignity is not a value concept that signifies some obscure property. But he does not acknowledge the basis of dignity that lies in a relation to ourselves in which we stand in determining ourselves as willing subjects. Although dignity is not the reason why the moral law is binding on us, it is of vital importance to understand the nature of Kant’s conception of obligation. Dignity denotes the normative priority of freedom and of the law of freedom as against the law of nature.

Keywords:: end in itself; moral law; categorical imperative; obligation

Published Online: 2015-3-20

Published in Print: 2015-3-20

You are currently not able to access this content.

Articles in the same Issue

https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2015-0007

Keywords for this article

end in itself; moral law; categorical imperative; obligation