Property Rights in an Entangled Political Economy
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Mikayla Novak
Abstract
This paper outlines key applications of property rights theory from the standpoint of ‘entangled political economy,’ which conceptualises economic and political agents interacting within society. The entangled political economy framework stresses that property rights denote relationships between societal members, and that property rights are the subject of evolutionary change. The nature and role of property rights in an entangled political economy reinforces the ‘bundle of rights’ perspective, challenging notions of property rights that emphasise the primacy of ownership. Far from necessarily imperilling the integrity of a market-based economic order, the bundle orientation inherent in entangled political economy can accommodate extensive market activities grounded in robust property right protections.
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