Volume 24, Issue 1 -

The doctrine of the “just price” is more than often described as the core of the “economic” thinking of the Scholastics (de Roover 1958; Baldwin 1959; Wilson 1975; Worland 1977). In fact, one could hardly contest that the notion occupies a place of high importance in the economic reflections of the Medieval Doctors. It is of no doubt that their study of economic reality led them to call up very frequently the said notion of “just price”. Yet the insistence with which modern historiography has itself treated this – central but particular – element of the Scholastic economic thinking conceals, to our opinion, some of its important sights and interests. An “objective” approach of the scholastic theory seems to command such an interpretation. But why is the phrase “just price” so often used and developed by the Doctors? Such a simple question cannot be answered simply by focusing on the notion. From a more “methodological” point of view, just price appears only like the final result of a complex argumentation. Little attention has been given to the fact that (1) the issue at stake is less a problem of correctness in limited bargaining than a general question of social justice; (2) the method used to deal with this vast subject in the field of economic relations is a systematic “contractual” analysis. The second point forms the main theme of this paper.

This paper outlines key applications of property rights theory from the standpoint of ‘entangled political economy,’ which conceptualises economic and political agents interacting within society. The entangled political economy framework stresses that property rights denote relationships between societal members, and that property rights are the subject of evolutionary change. The nature and role of property rights in an entangled political economy reinforces the ‘bundle of rights’ perspective, challenging notions of property rights that emphasise the primacy of ownership. Far from necessarily imperilling the integrity of a market-based economic order, the bundle orientation inherent in entangled political economy can accommodate extensive market activities grounded in robust property right protections.

In the third century AD, under the pressure of plagues, external invasion, rising army costs, and usurpation, the Roman emperors incrementally debased the silver coinage that was produced at their imperial mints and incrementally took over civic mints. The debasement, from 2.7 g of silver to 0.04 g of silver in the equivalent of a denarius from 160–274 ad , was accompanied by worries from emperors, mint-workers, and bankers about the value of the currency; however, the total loss of purchasing power of the Roman coinage from the same era was 50–70 %, far less than would be expected from the change in metallic content, if it were the primary source of value. The currency reform of Aurelian in 274 ad , despite raising metallic values of coins, was followed by at least a 90 % reduction in the purchasing power of the silver coinage from 274–301 ad , the year of Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum Prices, showing a paradoxically inverse relationship between metallic value and purchasing power. Based on this quandary, I argue that the Roman silver coinage of the third century CE became a fiat currency in some respects, deriving its guarantee from imperial iconography and assurances rather than from bullion value. The fiat nature of the silver coinage was largely present in usage as a medium of exchange for those without as much long-term interest in maintaining liquid stores of value; this is indicated by the differential debasement of the denarius and aureus ; imperial actions and hoarding practices indicate the extent to which the currency was accepted at nominal value. I examine the reactions of different social groups in order to determine the perceived value of the Roman coinage during this time, and in order to understand the paradoxical collapse in the currency’s value in the late third century. To demonstrate this, I will present the applicable elements of the modern concept of “fiat” to this context through portrayal of emperors and usurpers on coins, use coin hoard data to determine the effect of Gresham’s Law, and examine historical and papyrological accounts of currency reforms. I will also use evidence of the expansion of taxes in kind and the rejection of nominal value by both emperor and subjects to argue that the inflation following Aurelian’s reform resulted from an invalidation of the trust in imperial fiat.

This article studies the impact of a credit expansion monetary policy on output and unemployment rate. In the introduction the history of the Phillips curve and its interpretation are presented to understand why New Consensus Macroeconomics argues that monetary policy is neutral in long-run i. e. has no effect on economic activity and natural unemployment rate. This New Consensus Macroeconomics supports the independence of the Central Bank, inflation-targeting and the strategy of constrained discretion model and influences strongly the monetary policy of central bank today. The second section critics these three principles of the new consensus. It opposes free-banking to central banking system, and takes the defense of deflation to critic the inflation-targeting. Then the third section deals with long-run neutrality of monetary policy. In an Austrian Business Cycle perspective, there is neutrality of monetary only if the production structure must always return exactly to its level of before the boom. It is improbable, because the monetary policy via tax inflation and artificial variation of real interest rate has a long-run effects on the conditions of financing of entrepreneurial project and in fine all the market process dynamic.