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Esencia, definición y la tesis de identidad en Aristóteles, Metaphysica Z 4-6

  • Fabián Mié
Published/Copyright: September 28, 2018
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Abstract

To clarify Aristotle’s “Identity Thesis” in Metaphysics Z 6, according to which each strictly definable item must be identical to its own essence (1031a15-16, 1032a4- 6), I show that it is a simple corollary of some “logical” theorems drawn from the Organon, which have a direct impact on Z 4’s explanation that identity is based on the possession of essence. As I claim, Z 6’s innovation consists of a clarification about substance as that which - because of having essence - can fulfill the identity- condition. Therefore, Z 6’s argument targets principally “non-Identity” as a consequence of Platonic separation. Further, I argue against the commonly held view that the Identity Thesis stands on the hylomorphism of Z’s later chapters.

Published Online: 2018-09-28
Published in Print: 2015-06-01

© 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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