Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
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Katharina Nieswandt
Abstract
Laura Valentini’s novel theory, the Agency-Respect View, says that we have a fundamental moral duty to honor other people’s convictions, at least pro tanto and under certain conditions. I raise doubts that such a duty exists indeed and that informative conditions have been specified. The questions that Valentini faces here have a parallel in Kant’s moral philosophy, viz. the question of why one has a duty to value the other’s humanity and the question of how to specify the maxim of one’s action. Additionally, I discuss the concept of a social convention and Valentini’s use of it.
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Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium
- Moralism and Realism in Theorizing Social Norms
- Two Types of Social Norms
- Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms
- Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
- Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account
- General Part
- Moral Paradigms of Intergenerational Solidarity in the Coronavirus-Pandemic
- The Weight of History After October 7 and the Gaza War: Shaping a New Future
- Germany, Israel’s Security, and the Fight Against Anti-Semitism: Shadows from the Past and Current Tensions
- Kantian Rights and the Zionist Settlement in Palestine
- War and Self-Defense: Some Reflections on the War on Gaza
- Discussion
- What is Classical Realism?
- Do We Learn Anything from Kirshner?
- Classical Realism is not ‘Everything, Everywhere, All at Once’
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Do Socially Constructed Norms have Moral Force? Précis to a Symposium
- Moralism and Realism in Theorizing Social Norms
- Two Types of Social Norms
- Political Obligations and Respect for Social Norms
- Must I Honor Your Convictions? On Laura Valentini’s Agency-Respect View
- Social Norms and Obligation: Rescuing the Joint Commitment Account
- General Part
- Moral Paradigms of Intergenerational Solidarity in the Coronavirus-Pandemic
- The Weight of History After October 7 and the Gaza War: Shaping a New Future
- Germany, Israel’s Security, and the Fight Against Anti-Semitism: Shadows from the Past and Current Tensions
- Kantian Rights and the Zionist Settlement in Palestine
- War and Self-Defense: Some Reflections on the War on Gaza
- Discussion
- What is Classical Realism?
- Do We Learn Anything from Kirshner?
- Classical Realism is not ‘Everything, Everywhere, All at Once’
