“So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37
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Annalisa Coliva
Abstract
In On Certainty (1969, 35) Wittgenstein states that “There are physical objects” is nonsense. This claim is strongly reminiscent of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.1272), where he states that “one cannot say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”, and of TLP 4.1274, where he says “The question about the existence of a formal concept is nonsense”. Despite such a superficial similarity, however, the reasons why “There are (physical) objects” would be nonsense are entirely different. In the case of the Tractatus, they depend on the rules that govern a correct logical symbolism, on the distinction between saying and showing, and presuppose an ontology of objects. In the case of On Certainty, in contrast, they depend on thinking of “physical object” as a means of representation - as an “inference ticket”, which licenses (and forbids) certain inferences without any ontological import. In his 1950 paper “Empiricism, semantics and ontology”, Carnap proposes a metalinguistic reading of questions such as “Are there physical objects?”. Surprisingly, he credits Wittgenstein as a source of inspiration. If I am right, however, there is only a superficial similarity between the ideas presented in the Tractatus and Carnap’s. In fact, a deeper similarity is to be found between Carnap’s views and the ones that Wittgenstein developed, at about the same time, in On Certainty, published only in 1969, with which Carnap could have no familiarity. Yet even there, the divide between the two remains insurmountable, as they had entirely opposite views regarding the very possibility of there beinga metalanguage and, therefore, a metalinguistic reading of the question “Are there physical objects?”.
Abstract
In On Certainty (1969, 35) Wittgenstein states that “There are physical objects” is nonsense. This claim is strongly reminiscent of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.1272), where he states that “one cannot say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”, and of TLP 4.1274, where he says “The question about the existence of a formal concept is nonsense”. Despite such a superficial similarity, however, the reasons why “There are (physical) objects” would be nonsense are entirely different. In the case of the Tractatus, they depend on the rules that govern a correct logical symbolism, on the distinction between saying and showing, and presuppose an ontology of objects. In the case of On Certainty, in contrast, they depend on thinking of “physical object” as a means of representation - as an “inference ticket”, which licenses (and forbids) certain inferences without any ontological import. In his 1950 paper “Empiricism, semantics and ontology”, Carnap proposes a metalinguistic reading of questions such as “Are there physical objects?”. Surprisingly, he credits Wittgenstein as a source of inspiration. If I am right, however, there is only a superficial similarity between the ideas presented in the Tractatus and Carnap’s. In fact, a deeper similarity is to be found between Carnap’s views and the ones that Wittgenstein developed, at about the same time, in On Certainty, published only in 1969, with which Carnap could have no familiarity. Yet even there, the divide between the two remains insurmountable, as they had entirely opposite views regarding the very possibility of there beinga metalanguage and, therefore, a metalinguistic reading of the question “Are there physical objects?”.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
- Editorial 1
-
I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
- Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
- ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
- “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
- Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
- Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
- Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
- The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
- Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
- Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
- Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
- Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
- Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
- Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
- Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
- „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
- About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
- An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
- “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
- The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
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II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
- “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
- Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
- Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
- Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
- Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
- A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
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III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
- The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
- Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
- Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
- Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
- Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
- Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
- Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
- Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
- „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
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IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
- “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
- Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
- The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
- Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
- Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
- Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
- Index 633
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- Wittgenstein Publications Referred to by Abbreviation XI
- Editorial 1
-
I Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: 100 Years After
- Is There Aesthetics in the Tractatus? And If There Is, What Is It Doing There? 5
- ‚Also‘ sprach Wittgenstein: Prepositional Logic and Modal Qualificational Logic in the Tractatus 19
- “So Too it is Impossible for There to Be Propositions of Ethics”. A Novel Approach to Tractatus 6.42¹ 33
- Mauthner, Wittgenstein, and the Kraus Circle 45
- Tautologies and Theorems: The Epistemology of Logic of the Tractatus Is Not Self-Undermining 59
- Remarks on the Notion of ‘Expression’ in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – Against the Background of Frege’s Early Essays 73
- The Tractatus, Ethics, and the Unsayable 85
- Against Auto-Da-Fé: A Sanguine Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 101
- Wittgenstein’s Battlefield: The Kerensky Offensive 117
- Über den definitiven Text der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung. Die Geschichte der bisherigen Textverbesserungen und einige neue Vorschläge 133
- Some Early Reactions to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 145
- Wittgenstein on the Difficulty of Rejecting Metaphysics 165
- Unveiling the Complexity: Three Levels of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 185
- Wittgenstein in Green I: Ramsey Translates the Tractatus 199
- „Well then, what is logic about?“ – Anmerkungen zu einer als „überwunden“ geltenden Debatte über die „Gesetze des Denkens“ 211
- About a Possible Chronological Order of Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic 227
- An Outline of a Genetic Reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 255
- “Found Objects” in Wittgenstein: Concepts of the Meter 271
- The Epistemology of the Tractatus 287
-
II Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle
- “So one cannot, e. g., say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap via On Certainty 35– 37 303
- Wittgenstein and Ramsey on Probability, Frequency, and Belief 319
- Open Texture in Science and Philosophy 335
- Wittgenstein and Schlick: Two Approaches to Expression 347
- Our Method: Between Tractatus and Scientific World-Conception 361
- A Bull in a China Shop? Neurath on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 375
-
III Wittgenstein after the Tractatus
- The Unfortunate Pitfalls and Fruitful Temptations of Over-Interpretation 399
- Sraffa, Piccoli, and Wittgenstein’s 1931 Remarks on Gestures: A Reassessment 417
- Seeing the World Aright: Some Remarks on the Relations among Ethics, Aesthetics, and Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Early Work up to 1930 431
- Peculiar Presences and Remarkable Absences: Wittgenstein in Postmodernist French Philosophy 443
- Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophical Feeling and “the Relative Position of Logic and Mechanics” 463
- Skepticism in the Tractatus and in On Certainty 477
- Wittgensteins Ringen mit den Grenzen der Sprache 489
- Wittgenstein on Grammar in the Blue Book 507
- „Mancher wird sagen, daß mein Reden über den Begriff des Wissens irrelevant sei“ (BPP II, 289). Wittgensteins Kritik an den philosophischen Idealen des Sublimen und der Sublimierung 519
-
IV 70 Years after Wittgenstein’s Death: Nachlass, Editions, and New Sources
- “I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together” or: Tragedy and Irony in the History of Editing Wittgenstein as Exemplified in the Story of Peter Philipp’s Edition Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – Philosophische Untersuchungen 539
- Wittgensteins Gedankenbewegungen am Beispiel seines zweiten Buchprojekts, des Big Typescript: Die Zettelsammlung TS 212 – eine gewaltige Gedächtnisleistung – die zugleich Wittgensteins Schwierigkeiten zeigt, seine Gedanken in eine der damals möglichen Buchformen zu zwingen 549
- The Wittgenstein–Richards Correspondence and a Three-Level Model of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 567
- Copyright in Wittgenstein’s Nachlass 585
- Von Wright as Wittgenstein’s Literary Executor 595
- Nonsensical Actions and the Justification of Rules 619
- Index 633
