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        How Not to Misunderstand Peirce - A Pragmatist Account of Truth
- 
            
            
        JAY F. ROSENBERG
        
                                    
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                                            Chapters in this book
- I-IV I
- Contents V
- Introduction 1
- 
                            I The Correspondence Theory
- Truth : Concept and Property 11
- Truths and Truthmakers 27
- Truth Through Thick and Thin 38
- The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth 60
- Truth, Meaning, and Reference 79
- 
                            II Deflationism Defended
- Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth 103
- On Locating Our Interest in Truth 120
- Norms of Truth and Meaning 133
- On Some Critics of Deflationism 146
- 
                            III Deflationism Attacked
- Minimalism and the Facts About Truth 161
- Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth 176
- The Truth about Truth 194
- Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences 205
- 
                            IV Tarski Challenged
- An Argument Against Tarski's Convention Τ 225
- What is Truth? Stay for an Answer 238
- 
                            V Alternative Approaches
- The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth 249
- Truth: A Prolegomenon to a General Theory 263
- How Not to Misunderstand Peirce - A Pragmatist Account of Truth 283
- A Problem about Truth 299
- An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth 316
- Index of Subjects 333
- Index of Names 334
- Contributors 337
Chapters in this book
- I-IV I
- Contents V
- Introduction 1
- 
                            I The Correspondence Theory
- Truth : Concept and Property 11
- Truths and Truthmakers 27
- Truth Through Thick and Thin 38
- The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth 60
- Truth, Meaning, and Reference 79
- 
                            II Deflationism Defended
- Explanatory vs. Expressive Deflationism About Truth 103
- On Locating Our Interest in Truth 120
- Norms of Truth and Meaning 133
- On Some Critics of Deflationism 146
- 
                            III Deflationism Attacked
- Minimalism and the Facts About Truth 161
- Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth 176
- The Truth about Truth 194
- Generalizations of Homophonic Truth-sentences 205
- 
                            IV Tarski Challenged
- An Argument Against Tarski's Convention Τ 225
- What is Truth? Stay for an Answer 238
- 
                            V Alternative Approaches
- The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth 249
- Truth: A Prolegomenon to a General Theory 263
- How Not to Misunderstand Peirce - A Pragmatist Account of Truth 283
- A Problem about Truth 299
- An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth 316
- Index of Subjects 333
- Index of Names 334
- Contributors 337