Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure
-
Lisa Schmalzried
Abstract
It is natural to describe experiences of human beauty as involving attraction. This attraction thesis presumably contracts Kant′s thesis of disinterestedness. Therefore, I examine both theses and their compatibility. First, I will propose to analyze experiences of human beauty as experiences of amiability. Secondly, I will argue that amiability experiences are disinterested in a weak but not strong sense. My third point is that Kant defends strong disinterestedness. It follows from the assumption of the free play of our powers of cognition which is, for him, essential to explain the subjective-objective-hybridity of beauty judgments. Aesthetic dispositionalism provides another way to explain this hybridity, however. This explanation is not committed to the strong claim of disinterestedness. And it is compatible with the amiability thesis. So, one has no compelling reason to accept Kant′s claim that all beauty experiences, including those of human beauty, need to be disinterested in a strong sense.
Abstract
It is natural to describe experiences of human beauty as involving attraction. This attraction thesis presumably contracts Kant′s thesis of disinterestedness. Therefore, I examine both theses and their compatibility. First, I will propose to analyze experiences of human beauty as experiences of amiability. Secondly, I will argue that amiability experiences are disinterested in a weak but not strong sense. My third point is that Kant defends strong disinterestedness. It follows from the assumption of the free play of our powers of cognition which is, for him, essential to explain the subjective-objective-hybridity of beauty judgments. Aesthetic dispositionalism provides another way to explain this hybridity, however. This explanation is not committed to the strong claim of disinterestedness. And it is compatible with the amiability thesis. So, one has no compelling reason to accept Kant′s claim that all beauty experiences, including those of human beauty, need to be disinterested in a strong sense.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
-
Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
-
(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
-
(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
-
(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
-
Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
-
(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
-
(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
-
(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
