Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty
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Dominic McIver Lopes
Abstract
Pleasure is standardly conceived as a state that motivates. This chapter considers three accounts of disinterested pleasure as motivating. On one, it motivates strictly internal states because it is non-conceptual. On a second, it motivates strictly internal states because the link between motivating internal states and world-oriented acts has been inhibited. On the third, it motivates only contemplative acts. All three accounts are coherent. However, none of the three accounts of disinterested pleasure is an account of aesthetic pleasure, where aesthetic pleasure serves either to demarcate aesthetic values or to explain why facts about aesthetic value are reason-giving. The conclusion is that we have no reason to appeal to disinterested pleasure in aesthetics.
Abstract
Pleasure is standardly conceived as a state that motivates. This chapter considers three accounts of disinterested pleasure as motivating. On one, it motivates strictly internal states because it is non-conceptual. On a second, it motivates strictly internal states because the link between motivating internal states and world-oriented acts has been inhibited. On the third, it motivates only contemplative acts. All three accounts are coherent. However, none of the three accounts of disinterested pleasure is an account of aesthetic pleasure, where aesthetic pleasure serves either to demarcate aesthetic values or to explain why facts about aesthetic value are reason-giving. The conclusion is that we have no reason to appeal to disinterested pleasure in aesthetics.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
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Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
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Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
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(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
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(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
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(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
-
Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
-
(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
-
(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
-
(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
