Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control
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Stefano Velotti
Abstract
This essay aims to show how the transcendental aesthetic principle sought by Kant reveals itself not only as the principle of determination of aesthetic experience, both artistic and non-artistic, but also as a necessary principle for making sense of human experience in general. I begin by addressing some fundamental misunderstandings that still plague the study of Kantian disinterestedness, as well as by questioning its psychological redescription. Rejecting the thesis according to which works of art ought not to be considered examples of “free beauty” but only of “dependent beauty,” the essay reconsiders the meaning to be attributed to “nature” as the “supersensible substratum” of our faculties. What emerges from my analysis here is a vision of Kant’s transcendental as essentially in the making, at once both “natural” and “to be acquired.” And yet, notwithstanding our moral responsibility to try to make sense of experience, we cannot pursue this end merely by clinging to what we can directly control.
Abstract
This essay aims to show how the transcendental aesthetic principle sought by Kant reveals itself not only as the principle of determination of aesthetic experience, both artistic and non-artistic, but also as a necessary principle for making sense of human experience in general. I begin by addressing some fundamental misunderstandings that still plague the study of Kantian disinterestedness, as well as by questioning its psychological redescription. Rejecting the thesis according to which works of art ought not to be considered examples of “free beauty” but only of “dependent beauty,” the essay reconsiders the meaning to be attributed to “nature” as the “supersensible substratum” of our faculties. What emerges from my analysis here is a vision of Kant’s transcendental as essentially in the making, at once both “natural” and “to be acquired.” And yet, notwithstanding our moral responsibility to try to make sense of experience, we cannot pursue this end merely by clinging to what we can directly control.
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
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Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
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Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
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(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
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(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
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(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Acknowledgments V
- Table of Contents VII
- Introduction 1
-
Part I Disinterestedness in Kant
- Disinterestedness by Any Other Name: Kant and Mendelssohn 11
- What Is It Like to Feel Beauty? The Complex Meaning of Kant’s Thesis of Disinterestedness 31
- Disinterestedness: Analysis and Partial Defense 59
- Disinterestedness and Its Role in Kant’s Aesthetics 87
- Making Sense: Disinterestedness and Control 105
-
Part II Disinterestedness With and Beyond Kant
-
(a) Disinterest Advocates
- The Myth of the Absent Self: Disinterest, the Self, and Evaluative Self-Consciousness 135
- Aesthetic Disinterestedness Revisited 167
-
(b) Something in Between
- The Playful Negotiation of Interests: Kant in Conversation with Fried and Winnicott 183
- Human Beauty, Attraction, and Disinterested Pleasure 211
-
(c) Disinterest Critics
- Pleasure, Desire, and Beauty 233
- Beyond Hedonism about Aesthetic Value 257
- Author Index 275
- Subject Index 279
