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The Fate of Dignity: How Words Matter

  • Karl Ameriks
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Kant’s Concept of Dignity
This chapter is in the book Kant’s Concept of Dignity

Abstract

In recent years, Kant views on dignity have been challenged by a wave of attacks from authors, outside and inside of philosophy, who criticize his remarks for their connection with serious evils such as racism and anti-Semitism. I compare and contrast two recent critiques along this line-one by Michael Lackey, on how Kant’s terms were used by H.S. Chamberlain and the fascists, and one by Paul Franks, who puts several of Kant’s distressing comments in the context of German Idealism and anti-Judaism in general. I also draw on insights by Charles W. Mills and Lucy Allais, which point toward a diagnosis of the kind of “cognitive blindness” that Kant and others have exhibited on these issues. After taking into account his surprising attitude toward people in North America, I argue that Kant’s errors are not simply a matter of racism but should be understood as rooted in broader blindnesses about cultures (even ones that he takes to be of the same race) outside his northern European Protestant background.

Abstract

In recent years, Kant views on dignity have been challenged by a wave of attacks from authors, outside and inside of philosophy, who criticize his remarks for their connection with serious evils such as racism and anti-Semitism. I compare and contrast two recent critiques along this line-one by Michael Lackey, on how Kant’s terms were used by H.S. Chamberlain and the fascists, and one by Paul Franks, who puts several of Kant’s distressing comments in the context of German Idealism and anti-Judaism in general. I also draw on insights by Charles W. Mills and Lucy Allais, which point toward a diagnosis of the kind of “cognitive blindness” that Kant and others have exhibited on these issues. After taking into account his surprising attitude toward people in North America, I argue that Kant’s errors are not simply a matter of racism but should be understood as rooted in broader blindnesses about cultures (even ones that he takes to be of the same race) outside his northern European Protestant background.

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