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Kant’s “Idea” of Dignity. Value and Moral Elevation in the Groundlaying

  • Susan Meld Shell
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Kant’s Concept of Dignity
This chapter is in the book Kant’s Concept of Dignity

Abstract

As Oliver Sensen has convincingly argued (Sensen 2011), dignity in the Groundlaying applies, in the first instance, to a state of elevation associated with the moral law as the primary object of respect. At the same time, Kant also uses “dignity” to designate what he calls unconditional or inner value.¹ I will argue in what follows that there is no need to choose: moral dignity for Kant is both elevation and unconditional value, i. e., an inner worth, albeit one that can be represented adequately only through negative reference to that which it is “set infinitely above.” This conceptual complexity, as I will argue, renders it particularly well-suited to responding to the “natural dialectic” (GMS 4:392) that makes a philosophic “groundlaying” necessary at all (GMS 4:405); it also can help resolve a persistent conflict among Kant’s readers² between those who locate ultimate value in the moral law, and those who associate it with an “objective” end, such as freedom or humanity.

Abstract

As Oliver Sensen has convincingly argued (Sensen 2011), dignity in the Groundlaying applies, in the first instance, to a state of elevation associated with the moral law as the primary object of respect. At the same time, Kant also uses “dignity” to designate what he calls unconditional or inner value.¹ I will argue in what follows that there is no need to choose: moral dignity for Kant is both elevation and unconditional value, i. e., an inner worth, albeit one that can be represented adequately only through negative reference to that which it is “set infinitely above.” This conceptual complexity, as I will argue, renders it particularly well-suited to responding to the “natural dialectic” (GMS 4:392) that makes a philosophic “groundlaying” necessary at all (GMS 4:405); it also can help resolve a persistent conflict among Kant’s readers² between those who locate ultimate value in the moral law, and those who associate it with an “objective” end, such as freedom or humanity.

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