Wittgenstein. Ordinary Language as Lifeform
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Sandra Laugier
Abstract
The concept of form of life is simultaneously and inseparably overvalued and neglected in Wittgenstein’s work. The author aims to understand the concept of form of life, or lifeform (as Cavell proposes to translate Lebensform), as an alternative to the concept of rules in the exploration of ordinary language. Cavell shows at once the fragility and the depth of our agreements, and he seeks out the nature of the necessities that emerge from our forms of life. Ordinary language philosophy as inherited by Cavell is thus anchored in an attention to language as it is commonly used, as part and milieu of our everyday interactions and conversations. Attention to ordinary language is also attention to neglected realities and to the constant risk of failure of conversation in everyday life. Recognizing the vulnerability of language - excuses, e. g., in their everyday recognition of human vulnerability and tragedy - allows us to recognize the human lifeform as itself vulnerable. Contemporary philosophy often sees recourse to the ordinary, to forms of life (as given), as a too-easy solution to skepticism. But the threat of destruction of forms of life (social and biological) in the present world gives the concept of Lebensform renewed reality and relevance: It is to turn us toward the unending political evaluation of the confrontation between need and rule, and to compare this with Emerson’s recurrence to the collisions of power and form, that I have urged noticing the key ambiguity in Wittgenstein’s concept of a form of life. The concept projects simultaneously, as I take it, an irreducibly horizontal ethnological or conventional axis crossing an irreducibly vertical biological axis,which is in effect to picture human existence as that life form which eternally criticizes itself - as it were from below and from beyond - or incessantly declines to. (Cavell 2010: 108)
Abstract
The concept of form of life is simultaneously and inseparably overvalued and neglected in Wittgenstein’s work. The author aims to understand the concept of form of life, or lifeform (as Cavell proposes to translate Lebensform), as an alternative to the concept of rules in the exploration of ordinary language. Cavell shows at once the fragility and the depth of our agreements, and he seeks out the nature of the necessities that emerge from our forms of life. Ordinary language philosophy as inherited by Cavell is thus anchored in an attention to language as it is commonly used, as part and milieu of our everyday interactions and conversations. Attention to ordinary language is also attention to neglected realities and to the constant risk of failure of conversation in everyday life. Recognizing the vulnerability of language - excuses, e. g., in their everyday recognition of human vulnerability and tragedy - allows us to recognize the human lifeform as itself vulnerable. Contemporary philosophy often sees recourse to the ordinary, to forms of life (as given), as a too-easy solution to skepticism. But the threat of destruction of forms of life (social and biological) in the present world gives the concept of Lebensform renewed reality and relevance: It is to turn us toward the unending political evaluation of the confrontation between need and rule, and to compare this with Emerson’s recurrence to the collisions of power and form, that I have urged noticing the key ambiguity in Wittgenstein’s concept of a form of life. The concept projects simultaneously, as I take it, an irreducibly horizontal ethnological or conventional axis crossing an irreducibly vertical biological axis,which is in effect to picture human existence as that life form which eternally criticizes itself - as it were from below and from beyond - or incessantly declines to. (Cavell 2010: 108)
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Introduction: The Form of Our Life with Language 1
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Paths to Form(s) of Life
- The Rule of the Game (The Moment of Truth) 11
- Lebensformen: Living Logic 59
- Human Life and Self-consciousness. The Idea of ‘Our’ Form of Life in Hegel and Wittgenstein 93
- Duality, Force, Language-games and Our Form of Life 113
-
Form(s) of Life: the Very Idea
- Our Life with Truth 155
- Language-games, Lebensform, and the Ancient City 173
- Language-games and Forms of Life in Mathematics 193
- The Representation of Language 219
-
Form(s) of Life after Wittgenstein
- Wittgenstein and the Difficulty of What Normally Goes Without Saying 253
- Wittgenstein. Ordinary Language as Lifeform 277
- Hostage to a Stranger 305
- Biographical Notes 331
- Index 333
Chapters in this book
- Frontmatter I
- Table of Contents V
- List of Abbreviations VII
- Introduction: The Form of Our Life with Language 1
-
Paths to Form(s) of Life
- The Rule of the Game (The Moment of Truth) 11
- Lebensformen: Living Logic 59
- Human Life and Self-consciousness. The Idea of ‘Our’ Form of Life in Hegel and Wittgenstein 93
- Duality, Force, Language-games and Our Form of Life 113
-
Form(s) of Life: the Very Idea
- Our Life with Truth 155
- Language-games, Lebensform, and the Ancient City 173
- Language-games and Forms of Life in Mathematics 193
- The Representation of Language 219
-
Form(s) of Life after Wittgenstein
- Wittgenstein and the Difficulty of What Normally Goes Without Saying 253
- Wittgenstein. Ordinary Language as Lifeform 277
- Hostage to a Stranger 305
- Biographical Notes 331
- Index 333
